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Abstract
Political commentators warn that the fragmentation of the modern media landscape induces
voters to withdraw into “information cocoons” and segregate along ideological lines. We show
that the option to abstain breaks ideological segregation and generates “cross-over” in news
consumption: voters with considerable leanings toward a candidate demand information that is
less biased toward that candidate than voters who are more centrist. This non-monotonicity in
the demand for slant makes voters’ ideologies non-recoverable from their choice of news media
and generates disproportionate demand for media outlets that are centrist or only moderately
biased. It also implies that polarization of the electorate may lead to ideological moderation
in news consumption. Thus, our results cast doubt on the oft-prophesied, imminent demise of
mainstream media and may help to explain recent empirical ?ndings showing less ideological
segregation in news consumption than predicted by extant theories.
JEL Codes: C7, D7, D8.
1 Introduction
Before the advent of cable TV and the internet, the US market for non-local news was dominated
by a few network channels and a handful of newspapers with national reach. The modern media
landscape, by contrast, features an overwhelming array of news outlets, catering to virtually every
ideological bias and belief. Moreover, the IT revolution has given people the power to customize the
news and opinion they consume, tailoring it to ?t their preferences. Commentators have argued that
this induces individuals to self-segregate along ideological lines, undisturbed by di?ering viewpoints
or even facts contrary to their world view. It is claimed that, as a result, we live in a society where
?We thank David Ahn, Bob Anderson, Ned Augenblick, Ernesto Dal Bo, Rui de Figueiredo, William Fuchs,
Faruk Gul, Ben Hermalin, Matias Iaryczower, Adam Meirowitz, Bob Powell, Keith Takeda, Justin Tumlinson, and,
especially, Mike Golosov, John Morgan and Alessandro Pavan, for very helpful comments and suggestions.
1
“many people live in information cocoons in which they only talk to members of their own party and
read blogs of their own sect” (Brooks (2010)). Sunstein (2002) expresses a similar sentiment: “Our
communications market is rapidly moving [toward a situation where] people restrict themselves
to their own points of view–liberals watching and reading mostly or only liberals; moderates,
moderates; conservatives, conservatives; Neo-Nazis, Neo-Nazis.” This limits “encounters [that are]
central to democracy itself.” Thus, while the proliferation of news outlets and the ability to create
“Daily Me” newspapers is, no doubt, a boon to individuals, at a societal level it is potentially
baneful. Indeed, by destroying the common experience and understanding that resulted from
everybody consulting the same news outlets, the Daily Me phenomenon might fray the social
fabric, fan the dreaded “culture wars,” and lead to the atomization of society. (See Sunstein (2002),
Sunstein (2009), and Jamieson and Cappella (2010).)
Relying on binary decision models, formal theory by and large con?rms this self-segregation
hypothesis: for purely instrumental reasons, rational voters prefer information sources whose biases
conform to their own, both in direction and degree (see Calvert (1985) and Suen (2004)). To see
why, consider a liberal and a conservative candidate competing in a majoritarian election. The
candidates di?er sharply in their policy positions. The “correct” policies to address the polity’s
problems are determined by a draw from nature. When the state is liberal, the policies espoused
by the liberal candidate are more e?ective, while the reverse is true when the state is conservative.
All voters prefer superior outcomes, but they di?er in their ideologies–i.e., their prior beliefs that
the policies proposed by a given candidate are the most e?ective in addressing the challenges at
hand. Prior to voting, voters consult a news outlet, customized to their taste, to determine which
candidate o?ers the better policies. News outlets are biased, characterized by Type I and Type II
error with a centrist outlet having equal errors of each type.
What motivates rational voters to choose a biased outlet is the hurdle in overcoming their own
ideology. Under compulsory voting, a voter with an ideology favoring the conservative candidate
chooses a news outlet more likely to favor the conservative candidate in either state. The reason
is that, should this outlet unexpectedly favor the liberal candidate, it o?ers compelling evidence,
su?cient to overcome the voter’s ideology, that the liberal candidate is the correct choice. Thus,
in these models, voters exhibit a strong “demand for slant.” Indeed, as the population of voters
becomes ideologically polarized, relatively centrist media outlets see customers desert in droves.
Despite this prediction, and the greater polarization of the US electorate manifesting itself
in the Tea Party and Occupy movements, centrist news outlets have not fallen by the wayside.
Indeed, programs such as PBS’s Newshour and ABC’s Good Morning America, among the most
centrist of all national US media outlets according to Milyo (2005), have maintained high ratings.1
In addition, new centrist outlets, such as Yahoo, have successfully entered the scene. Another
1For morning show ratings see http://www.mediabistro.com. For a discussion of the success of PBS’s Newshour,
see Hagey (2011).
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challenge to the received wisdom that voters only listen to views narrowly aligned to their own
is provided by Gentzkow and Shapiro (2011), who ?nd much less ideological segregation in news
consumption than suggested by the existing theory. Instead, they observe signi?cant “cross-over”
behavior, with some relatively conservative voters consulting relatively liberal news media–and
vice versa. Similar results were found by Pew (2008) and Pew (2009). Thus, there is a disconnect
between the dire predictions of the commentariat and the existing theory on the one hand, and the
(perhaps more reassuring) reality on the other.
In this paper, we show that enriching the standard model with the realistic feature of abstention
(i.e., the option to stay home from the polls) su?ces to reconcile the apparent disconnect. To
see how this amendment to the model fundamentally changes the demand for slant, consider the
situation of a moderately polarized voter. In the standard model with compulsory voting, such a
voter chooses a relatively extreme news outlet and follows its advice at the polls. In the model with
abstention, such a voter turns out only when the signal favors his ex ante preferred candidate; if
the signal favors the candidate of the opposite ideology, he prefers to stay home. As we show, the
crux is that, for this modi?ed plan, a centrist or near-centrist outlet is in fact better suited than
a more extreme outlet. As a result, some polarized voters optimally choose less ideological outlets
than their intrinsically more centrist brethren.
The intuition for this abstention-induced non-monotonicity is as follows. First, centrist and
mildly polarized voters continue to behave under voluntary voting as they do under compulsory
voting. That is, the former consult and follow a centrist outlet, while the latter follow a paper with a
mild, conforming bias. Next, consider a liberal voter (say) whose prior beliefs are more pronounced.
For such a voter to follow his news outlet when it tells him to vote for the conservative candidate,
he needs to be consulting an outlet with a strong liberal bias. This comes at the cost of virtually
always voting for the liberal candidate, even when the state is conservative, as an outlet with a
strong liberal bias rarely comes out in favor of the conservative candidate. Nonetheless, if the voter
had to choose between the two candidates, this would be his best option. Suppose, however, that
the voter has the option of supporting neither candidate and abstaining. For the usual reasons
related to the Swing Voter’s Curse (Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996)), upon receiving the signal
that the state is conservative, abstaining rather than voting for the conservative candidate is indeed
an attractive alternative for such a liberal-leaning voter.
What does abstaining do to this voter’s optimal choice of news outlet? That is, how biased
does he want his outlet to be if he only follows its recommendation when the advice is to vote
for the liberal candidate, but abstains when the advice is to vote for the conservative candidate?
As he no longer plans on voting for the conservative candidate upon receiving the signal that
the state is conservative, his original rationale for consulting an outlet with a strong liberal bias
has signi?cantly diminished. In relative terms, he now worries more about voting for the liberal
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candidate when the state is in fact conservative. Hence, he wants to raise the level of certainty
conveyed by the “liberal” signal and, therefore, prefers to consult a strictly more centrist outlet. In
other words, the outlet of choice of this liberal-leaning voter who sometimes abstains is less biased
than that of some intrinsically more centrist voter who follows his news outlet’s recommendation
in both directions. Notice that, as a result, he also votes for the liberal candidate less often.
Our results present a challenge to a researcher seeking to infer voters’ ideologies and level of
polarization from the electorate’s news consumption. With abstention, it is no longer true that
the more a voter favors a given side, the more biased the news outlet chosen. Instead, the selected
outlet o?ers a jumble of possibilities. Less ideological voters may select more ideological outlets
than their more ideological counterparts, and vice-versa. Hence, as the population becomes more
ideologically polarized, demand for centrist and near-centrist outlets may in fact increase.
Another factor favoring mainstream media is that, unlike their more extreme counterparts,
center-left and center-right news outlets serve multiple constituencies: those who are ideologically
aligned with the outlet, and those whose beliefs are more pronounced. The former follow their
outlet’s voting recommendation in both directions, while the latter follow it only when it conforms
to their prior and abstain otherwise. As a result, mainstream media bene?t from disproportionate
demand for their services. Thus, our ?ndings suggest that the oft-prophesied, imminent demise of
mainstream media in a polarizing world is perhaps exaggerated. (See, e.g., Calderone (2009) and
Fineman (2005).)
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a simple example
illustrating the main point of the paper. Section 3 introduces the general model, which we solve in
Section 4. In Section 5 we analyze the demand for slant. In Section 6 we discuss some extensions
and limitations of the model, while Section 7 reviews the related literature. Finally, Section 8
concludes. Formal proofs are relegated to an Appendix.
2 An example
The results in this paper are driven by the observation that the option to abstain makes the
demand for slant non-monotone in ideology. That is, certain voters with considerable leanings
toward a candidate demand information that is less biased toward that candidate than voters who
are more centrist. The intuition is illustrated in the following example. Consider a voter with the
following preferences: he gains ? = 1 if he votes for the “right” candidate, but loses ? = 2 ? ? if
he votes for the “wrong” candidate. In addition, he has the option to abstain, which gives him a
utility of 0. From the perspective of the voter, the “right” candidate is determined by the state of
nature: in state ?, the right candidate is D ; in state ?, the right candidate is R. The voter’s prior
belief that the state is ? is equal to ? ? [0? 1]. We say that the higher is ?, the more “biased” is the
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voter toward candidate R.
The voter can consult one of two news outlets, labeled r and d. Before the election, the outlets
publish editorials supporting one of the candidates. Formally, support for candidate ? is expressed
by sending a signal ??, while support for candidate R is expressed by sending a signal ??. News
outlet d supports candidate D in state ? 75% of the time, while it supports candidate R in state
? 65% of the time. Conversely, news outlet r supports candidate R in state ? 75% of the time,
while it supports candidate D in state ? 65% of the time. Hence, in both states, outlet d supports
candidate D more often than does outlet r , while outlet r supports candidate R more often. In an
intuitive sense, this makes d relatively biased toward D , and r relatively biased toward R.
Let ?k? (?) denote the voter’s posterior belief that the state is ? upon receiving a signal ? from
outlet k. By Bayes’ rule, ?d? (?) ? ?r? (?) for all ? ? {??? ??}. That is, a signal ? from outlet d
provides stronger evidence that the state is ? than the same signal from outlet r.
Which news outlet, if any, does the voter consult, and how does this depend on whether voting
is mandatory? When voting is mandatory, the voter must choose between: 1) always voting for D ,
2) always voting for R, and 3) voting for D after ?? and voting for R after ??. We denote these
strategies by DD , RR, and DR, respectively. (Notice that the strategy RD , i.e., voting for R after
?? and voting for D after ??, is strictly dominated and, hence, ignored.) When playing DR, the
voter also has to decide which news outlet to consult.
The voter’s expected utility from voting for D after receiving the signal ?? from outlet k is
?k? (D ? ??) = 1×
³
1? ?k? (??)
´
? 2× ?k? (??) (1)
Similarly, his utility of voting for R after receiving the signal ?? from outlet k is
?k? (R? ??) = 1× ?k? (??)? 2×
³
1? ?k? (??)
´
(2)
The expected utility from playing the voting strategy DR while consulting outlet k is then
?k? (DR) = ?k? (D ? ??)× Pr (?? | k? ?) + ?k? (R? ??)× Pr (?? | k? ?) (3)
Here, Pr (? | k? ?) denotes the probability that the voter assigns to outlet k sending the signal ?.
For instance, Pr (?? | d? ?) = ?75×?+ ?35×(1? ?). The expected utilities from the voting strategies
DD and RR, which do not depend on k, are equal to
?? (DD) = 1× (1? ?)? 2× ? (4)
?? (RR) = 1× ? ? 2× (1? ?)
Comparing (3) with (4), we ?nd that under compulsory voting: 1) for ? ? 518 , the voter does
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not consult a news outlet and always supports D ; 2) for 518 ? ? ?
1
2 , he consults outlet d and
follows its advice at the polls; 3) for 12 ? ? ?
13
18 , he consults and follows outlet r; 4) for
13
18 ? ?,
he once again consults neither outlet and always votes for R. Hence, under compulsory voting, the
voter only consults news outlets whose biases conform to his own. This is consistent with Calvert
(1985) and Suen (2004).
Why does the voter switch news outlet at ? = 12? Notice that the two outlets provide di?erent
services. While outlet d provides a high level of certainty that the state is ? when it sends the
signal ??, outlet r provides a high level of certainty that the state is ? when it sends the signal ??.
Depending on his prior, a voter attaches di?erent values to these certainties. A voter with ? ? 12
is predisposed to vote for D . Hence, in relative terms, he cares less about the additional certainty
that the state is ? provided by signal ??. By contrast, if he plans to vote against his prior and for R
after ??, he cares a lot about the additional certainty that the state is ? provided by signal ??. He
achieves this certainty by consulting outlet d. An analogous argument explains why a voter with
? ? 12 consults outlet r, if any.
When voting is voluntary, the voter’s optimal strategy is more complicated–and interesting.
First, abstention expands the set of (non-dominated) voting strategies with D?, ?R, and ??, which
correspond to: 1) voting for D after ?? and abstaining after ??, 2) abstaining after ?? and voting for
R after ??, and 3) abstaining after both signals. It is easily veri?ed that, for every ? ? [0? 1], there
exists at least one news outlet k ? {d? r} such that either ?k? (D ? ??) ? 0 or ?k? (R? ??) ? 0. Hence,
always abstaining is a dominated strategy for all prior beliefs. In addition, for a liberal-leaning
voter (i.e., ? ? 12), DR dominates RR and ?R, while for a conservative-leaning voter (i.e., ? ?
1
2),
DR dominates DD and D?. We may conclude that, for a liberal voter, only the voting strategies
DR, D?, and DD are relevant, while for a conservative voter the relevant strategies are DR, ?R,
and RR. When using a responsive voting strategy–i.e., D?, DR, or ?R–a voter also needs to
decide which news outlet to consult. Because of symmetry, we may limit attention to, say, the
liberal side of the ideological spectrum, i.e., ? ? 12 . Optimal behavior on the conservative side is
analogous.
Conditional on consulting outlet k, the expected utility from votingD? is ?k? (D ? ??)×Pr (?? | k? ?).
Using (1) and the relevant expressions for Pr (?? | k? ?), we ?nd that, conditional on D?, a voter
with beliefs ? ? 13 prefers to consult outlet d, while a voter with ? ?
1
3 prefers to consult outlet
r. Comparing the resulting expected payo? with that from the unresponsive voting strategy DD
given in (4), we ?nd that a voter with prior beliefs ? ? 531 prefers D? (in combination with the
optimal news outlet) to DD , while a voter with ? ? 531 prefers DD to D?.
It remains to determine which voters prefer DR over DD and D?. Conditional on playing
DR, a liberal voter always prefers consulting d over consulting r. The intuition for this rational
“con?rmation bias” is exactly the same as under compulsory voting. Comparing the expected
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Figure 1: Optimal choice of news outlet and voting strategy as a function of prior belief ?
payo? from DR with d to the payo? from D? with either d or r, we ?nd that a liberal voter prefers
DR if and only if ? ? 817 . (A fortiori, he also prefers DR over DD in that region.) Hence, a liberal
voter’s optimal strategy as a function of his prior is
DD for ? ? 531
D? d for 531 ? ? ?
1
3
D? r for 13 ? ? ?
8
17
DR d for 817 ? ? ?
1
2
A conservative voter’s optimal strategy is the mirror-image analogue. Figure 1 provides a graphical
representation.
The voting behavior is rather intuitive. An extremely liberal voter (? ? 531) always votes for
D . A less extreme liberal ( 531 ? ? ?
8
17) votes for D upon receiving ?? and abstains upon receiving
??. Finally, a moderate liberal ( 817 ? ? ?
1
2) votes for D upon receiving ?? and votes for R
upon receiving ??. The optimal choice of news outlet, by contrast, is rather curious: while voters
5
31 ? ? ?
1
3 and
8
17 ? ? ?
1
2 exhibit the familiar rational con?rmation bias, voters
1
3 ? ? ?
8
17
exhibit a rational anti-con?rmation bias. These liberal voters choose to “cross-over” and consult
the conservative outlet r, rather than the liberal outlet d. In other words, in addition to the switch
of news outlet at ? = 12 which also occurs under compulsory voting, on each side of the political
spectrum, we now have two more switches.
Let us continue to focus on the liberal side of the spectrum. At the ?rst switch, which occurs
at ? = 13 , only the news outlet changes (from d to r) while the voting strategy, D?, remains
unchanged. By contrast, the second switch, which occurs at ? = 817 , involves not only a change
in news outlet (from r back to d), but also a change in voting strategy (from D? to DR). The
intuition for these two switches is quite di?erent. While the switch at ? = 13 is a consequence of
the discreteness of the space of available news outlets, the switch at ? = 817 is a consequence of the
discrete nature of voting itself. As we shall see, this implies that the ?rst switch disappears when
we allow for a continuum of news outlets, while the second switch is a robust feature of any voting
environment.
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First, let us focus on the switch at ? = 13 , where only the news outlet but not the voting strategy
changes. The intuition for this switch is quite similar to the one at ? = 12 . Even though all voters in
the interval 531 ? ? ?
8
17 play D?, depending on the value of ?, they have di?erent default actions.
That is, if they had to decide purely on the basis of their prior, voters to the left of 13 would vote
for D , while the voters to the right of 13 would abstain. This makes these voters concerned about
di?erent attributes of the same voting strategy, D?. After any signal, a voter whose ? is close to 531
more strongly believes that the state is ? than a voter whose ? is close to 817 . Therefore, the former
values less than the latter any additional certainty that the state is ? after a signal ??. At the same
time, in order to abstain, the former needs more reassurance that the state is not ? after a signal
?? than the latter. Hence, the voter whose ? is close to 531 prefers an outlet, d, that provides strong
evidence that the state is not ? when sending the signal ??, while the voter whose ? is close to 817
prefers an outlet, r, that provides strong evidence that the state is ? when sending the signal ??.
The actual switch in news outlet occurs where the default action changes from D to ?.
The second switch, from r back to d, takes place at ? = 817 , and occurs for a rather di?erent
reason. Rather than the change in the default action, it is the change in (responsive) voting
strategy–from D? to DR–that induces the voter to change his news outlet. To see this, notice
that, by its very nature, the strategy space in voting environments is discrete. Hence, any change
in voting strategy entails a discontinuous change in the payo? function which, in turn, implies a
discontinuous change in the value of information. How does the value of information change when
the voting strategy changes from D? to DR? The jump from abstaining to voting for R after the
signal ?? makes the voter considerably more “concerned” about the certainty conveyed by the signal
??. The reason is that, instead of taking the relatively safe action of abstaining, he now plans to
take the much riskier action of voting against his prior. Suddenly, he attaches a lot more value to
having additional certainty that the state really is ? after observing ??. In order to achieve this,
he is willing to give up some certainty that the state is ? after ??. This explains why the switch in
voting strategy from D? to DR induces the voter to switch from news outlet r to news outlet d.
Our example is special in three respects. First, there are only two news outlets. Second, ? ? ?;
i.e., the bene?t of voting for the right candidate is smaller than the cost of voting for the wrong
candidate. Third, preferences are “pseudo-expressive,” in the sense that a voter’s payo? depends
on whether his vote matches the state. One may wonder which aspects of the example carry over
to more canonical voting environments with multiple news outlets, general cost-bene?t ratios, and
purely instrumental preferences. As we shall see, the discrete and non-monotone switch in news
outlet between the D? and DR regions is a robust phenomenon, while the discrete and monotone
switch within the D? region is not. (Again, in our discussion, we limit attention to the liberal side
of the ideological spectrum. Behavior on the conservative side is analogous.)
The switch within the D? region is a consequence of the fact that, while voters’ beliefs are
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changing smoothly, in the example, voters cannot smoothly adjust their choice of news outlet.
Instead, they have to choose between either d or r. However, as we have argued in the introduction,
the modern media landscape is characterized by a wide array of news outlets, catering to every
ideological bias and belief. Hence, in today’s world, people can adjust their choice of news outlet
more or less smoothly. When we account for this by allowing for a continuum of outlets spanning
the ideological spectrum, the discrete jump within D? disappears. Instead, within this interval,
there is a smooth and monotone change from liberal to more centrist outlets, as we move from the
ideological left toward the center.
As argued above, the discrete and non-monotone switch at the boundary between D? and DR
is caused not by the discreteness of the media landscape–indeed, it occurs in spite of it–but by
the change in (responsive) voting strategy. Note, however, that when the bene?t of voting for the
right candidate is greater than the cost of voting for the wrong candidate–i.e., ?? ? 1–no voter
ever abstains and the boundary between D? and DR does not exist. In that case, because there
is no switch from one responsive voting strategy to another, the demand for slant is a monotonic
function of ideology and our example has no bite. This raises the question whether ? ? ? or ? ? ?
is the “right” assumption.
When we study a voting model with fully rational voters and instrumental preferences, (the
analog of) the ratio ?? is endogenous. That is, the probabilities of the pivotal events that give rise to
the bene?ts and costs of casting a vote versus abstaining are determined in equilibrium. Moreover,
as explained in detail in Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996), voters who are (close to) indi?erent
between D and R su?er from the Swing Voter’s curse, which implies that they strictly prefer to
abstain rather than vote for either candidate. Hence, while in our simple example, we have to
assume that ? ? ? in order to generate abstention, in a more general model with instrumental
preferences, abstention is endogenously generated. This explains why the non-monotonicity and
discontinuity of the demand for slant are in fact robust phenomena, that extend beyond our simple
example to canonical voting environments.
3 The model
In Section 2, we studied a simple decision-theoretic example to illustrate the basic intuition behind
cross-over in news consumption. We now extend the analysis to a fully-?edged strategic voting
environment. Speci?cally, we study a two-candidate election with a Poisson number of voters who
have the option to abstain. Preferences are purely instrumental, i.e., voters only care about the
outcome of the election and not about their own vote. There are two kinds of voters, partisan and
non-partisan. Partisan voters always prefer one candidate over the other, while non-partisan voters,
who constitute the majority, want the winner of the election to match the state of nature. While
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all non-partisans prefer the Democratic candidate in the Democratic state and the Republican
candidate in the Republican state, they do, however, disagree as to the prior probability that these
states pertain. While some believe that the state is more likely to be Democratic, others believe
that the state is more likely to be Republican. We shall say that the former are leaning to, or
“biased” toward, the Democratic candidate, while the latter are leaning to or biased toward the
Republican candidate. Voters who think that the two states are more or less equally likely are
called centrists.
As is standard in the literature, before casting a ballot, voters receive a signal as to the state
of nature. Our innovation is to allow voters to choose from what kind of news outlet they receive
their information. News outlets, of which there are a continuum, send conditionally independent,
binary signals that are correlated with the state. These outlets span the ideological spectrum,
from strongly biased toward the Democratic candidate at one end, to strongly biased toward the
Republican candidate at the other end. An outlet that is biased toward the Democrat is very likely
to send the “Democratic” signal when the state is Democratic. In that sense, it has high accuracy
in that state. However, high accuracy in the Democratic state comes at the cost of low accuracy
in the Republican state. That is, even when the state is Republican, this news outlet is relatively
likely to send the Democratic signal. For an outlet that is biased toward the Republican the reverse
holds. Finally, a centrist news outlet is one whose accuracy is (close to) the same in the two states.
Once voters have consulted their preferred news outlet, if any, they simultaneously cast their
ballots or abstain. The candidate who receives the most votes wins the election and payo?s are
realized. Ties are resolved by a coin ?ip.
Formally, there are two candidates, ? ? {D ?R}, and two states of the world, ? ? {?? ?}. The
number of voters is Poisson distributed with mean ? (see Myerson (1998) and Myerson (2000)). The
probability that a voter is partisan is equal to ? ?
¡
0? 12
¢
and independent across voters.2 A partisan
voter prefers candidate R with probability ? and candidate D with the remaining probability, again
independently across voters.3 The remaining voters are non-partisan. Non-partisans receive a payo?
of zero when the winner of the election matches the state (i.e., ? = D and ? = ?, or ? = R and
? = ?), and incur a loss ? = ?1 otherwise.
We denote a non-partisan voter’s prior belief that the state is ? by ? ? [0? 1]. These beliefs
are private information and drawn independently from a distribution with cumulative distribution
function (CDF) ? on [0? 1] that admits a well-behaved probability density function (PDF) ? with
no mass points. Heterogeneous priors are sometimes considered controversial (see Aumman (1976),
Aumann (1987) and Morris (1995)). Notice, however, that our heterogeneous priors model is
2All results can be extended to the case where ? = 0, but some extra care is needed to prove existence. Details
can be provided upon request.
3Because the number of voters is Poisson distributed, we could accommodate “partisans” who always prefer to
abstain. This would not change the results.
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isomorphic to a standard common priors model with heterogenous payo?s, as in Austen-Smith
and Banks (1996).4 While these formulations are logically equivalent, for ease of exposition and
discussion, we stick to the heterogenous beliefs interpretation for the remainder of the paper.
Voters can cast a ballot for D , a ballot for R, or they can abstain, which we denote by ?.
Before casting a ballot, a voter can collect a signal ? ? {??? ??} from one news outlet. News outlets
are characterized by accuracies (??? ??) ? [0? 1]2 in state ? and state ?, respectively. Here, ?? is
the probability that the news outlet sends the (correct) signal ?? in state ?. Likewise, ?? is the
probability that the news outlet sends the (correct) signal ?? in state ?.
We identify a news outlet with its accuracy in state ? and assume that there is a continuum
of outlets, one for each ?? ? [0? 1]. The relationship between news outlets’ accuracies in the two
states is described by a function ? that maps an outlet’s accuracy in state ? into its accuracy
in state ?. That is, ?? = ? (??). We assume that ? is strictly decreasing, twice continuously
di?erentiable, and strictly concave. Strict concavity implies that increased accuracy in one state
becomes progressively more expensive in terms of reduced accuracy in the other state. It ensures
that, for a given voting strategy, a voter’s optimal choice of news outlet is “well-behaved” (i.e.,
continuous) in ? and in the ratio of pivotal probabilities. We further assume that ? runs from
? (0) = 1 to ? (1) = 0. This means that a news outlet can achieve perfect accuracy in state ?, but
only by always sending the signal ??. Similarly, perfect accuracy in state ? comes at the cost of
perfect inaccuracy in state ?. Finally, we let 0 ? ??0 (0) ? ??0 (1) ??. As we show below, this
implies that, for non-degenerate priors, posterior beliefs remain bounded away from 0 and 1. When
these assumptions are satis?ed, it is easy to show that there always exists a (unique) news outlet,
?˜ ? 12 , whose accuracy is the same in both states. (See Lemma 4 in Appendix B.) We call this
outlet perfectly centrist, and say that a news outlet is leaning to (or biased toward) R if ?? ? ?˜.
Bias toward D is de?ned analogously.
Summarizing,
Assumption 1 The accuracy function ? : [0? 1] ? [0? 1], which maps ?? into ??, is a strictly
decreasing, strictly concave, twice continuously di?erentiable bijection with 0 ? ??0 (0) ? ??0 (1) ?
?.
4To transform our model into a model with homogeneous 50-50 priors and heterogeneous payo?s, simply rede?ne
voters’ losses associated with the winner not matching the state to be ???? = ?2 (1? ??) in state ? and ???? = ?2??
in state ?. Conversely, to move from a homogenous prior ? and heterogeneous losses (????? ????) to heterogeneous
priors and homogenous, unit losses, rede?ne voters’ priors to be ?? = ?????(1??)????+????? . More generally, our model
can accommodate heterogeneity in both payo?s and beliefs, as long as preferences are “non-adversarial,” i.e., co-
monotone: that is, non-partisans agree that candidate ? is preferred in state ?, while candidate ? is preferred in
state ?. To see this, suppose non-partisan voter ? earns ?? when ? is elected in state ?, ?? when ? is elected in state
?, ?? when ? is elected in state ?, and ?? when ? is elected in state ?. When comparing a vote for ?, a vote for
?, and abstaining, only the payo? di?erences ???? ? ?? ? ?? and ???? ? ?? ? ?? matter. Provided that preferences are
co-monotone such that ????? ???? ? 0 for all ?, this implies that we can rede?ne voters’ priors to be ?0 = ?????(1??)????+?????
and proceed as before.
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For maximum generality, we have simply postulated an accuracy function? and endowed it with
certain plausible properties. This naturally raises the question what kind of information technology
and behavior on the part of media outlets generates accuracy functions with the assumed properties.
In Appendix A we provide a micro-foundation for? and show that such accuracy functions naturally
arise when media outlets observe a noisy continuous signal that they coarsen into a binary voting
recommendation, using some threshold rule. (See also Suen (2004).)
For ease of exposition, we impose one additional assumption on ?, namely, that it gives rise to
“increasing elasticities.” Speci?cally, denote by ??? ?1??? the elasticity of inaccuracy 1??? in state ?
with respect to accuracy ?? in state ?. That is, ????1??? measures the percentage rise in inaccuracy
in state ? associated with a one percent rise in accuracy in state ?. Formally,
??? ?1??? =
? (1? ??)
???
??
1? ??
=
??0 (??) ??
1?? (??)
Similarly, ????1??? is the elasticity of inaccuracy 1 ? ?? in state ? with respect to accuracy ?? in
state ?. I.e.,
????1??? =
? (1? ??)
???
??
1? ??
=
? (??)
??0 (??) (1? ??)
When ??? ?1??? and ????1??? are strictly increasing in ?? and ??, respectively, then each percentage
increase in accuracy in one state becomes progressively more expensive in terms of reduced accuracy
in the other state, again expressed in percentage terms. It is easy to verify that this property implies
strict concavity of ?, but that the reverse implication does not hold. Strictly increasing elasticities
only play a role in the proof of Proposition 1. They ensure that all payo? functions satisfy single-
crossing in ? and, thereby, make equilibrium behavior particularly simple to characterize.
Assumption 2 Elasticities ????1??? and ????1??? are strictly increasing in ?? and ??, respectively.
A micro-foundation for Assumption 2 can be found in Appendix A. In Section 6 we relax this
assumption and show that our results remain essentially unchanged.
In order to better understand the informational implications of choosing a particular news outlet
??, we now study the posterior beliefs it induces. Denote by ???? (?) a voter’s posterior belief that
the state is ? upon receiving a signal ? from news outlet ??. By Bayes’ rule,
???? (??) =
μ
1 +
1?? (??)
??
1? ?
?
¶?1
and ???? (??) = 1?
μ
1 +
1? ??
? (??)
?
1? ?
¶?1
(5)
Di?erentiating with respect to ?? reveals that ???? (??) and ?
??
? (??) are monotonically decreasing in
??. (See Lemma 4 in the Appendix.) This is intuitive. Higher ?? means that a news outlet is more
biased toward R, such that a signal ?? conveys less evidence that the state is indeed ?. This makes
???? (??), the posterior belief that the state is ? after ??, decreasing in ??. At the same time, higher
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?? also means that the signal ?? conveys more evidence that the state is not ?. This makes ???? (??),
the posterior belief that the state is ? after ??, also decreasing in ??.
For ?? ? 0, ???? (??) and ?
??
? (??) approach their suprema
?
???0(0)(1??) ? 1 and ?, respectively.
For ?? ? 1, ???? (??) and ?
??
? (??) approach their in?ma ? and
?
???0(1)(1??) ? 0. (See Lemma 4 in
Appendix B.) Because ??0 (0) ? 0, upon receiving the signal ??, a voter achieves less than perfect
certainty that the state is ? even when ?? ? 0. Similarly, because ??0 (1) ? ?, upon receiving
the signal ??, a voter achieves less than perfect certainty that the state is not ? (i.e., ?) even when
?? ? 1.5
Voters receive signals that are conditionally independent. This implies that, in line with the ex-
tant literature, voters who consult media outlets with the same accuracy do not necessarily receive
the same signal. This assumption is made purely for technical convenience. Assuming conditional
independence reduces the level of correlation across voters’ signals. Since our model involves contin-
uous types and continuous media outlets, correcting for this reduction in correlation would require
taking care of complex measurability issues. As should be clear from the underlying intuition, this
would not a?ect the main result of our paper–i.e., the non-monotonicity and discontinuity of the
demand for slant. However, it would considerably increase the complexity and length of the proofs.
The timing of the game is as follows: 1) Nature selects the state, the number of voters, and
the pro?le of voter types. 2) Each voter observes his own type. 3) Voters privately decide which
news outlet to consult and they draw a private and conditionally independent signal from the
selected outlet. 4) Ballots are cast, the winner is selected according to majority rule, and payo?s
are realized. Ties are resolved by a coin ?ip.
In this game, the optimal behavior of partisan voters is trivial: they simply vote according to
their party a?liation. Indeed, since non-partisans are the only ones who act strategically, in the
remainder, “voter” refers to non-partisan voter. Non-partisans must choose which news outlet to
consult, if any, and how to vote. For them, a strategy consists of a tuple (?? ? ). Here, ? is a
measurable function mapping a voter’s prior ? into a choice of news outlet, ??. We refer to ? as
the demand for slant and assume that a voter only consults a news outlet if it leaves him strictly
better o?. The act of not consulting an outlet is denoted by ?. Hence, ? : [0? 1]? [0? 1]? {?}. The
function ? , which we refer to as the voting strategy, maps signals {??? ??} into a vote for D , a vote
for R, or abstention. Hence, ? = {??? ??}? {D ?R??}. We denote particular voting strategies as
follows: DR refers to voting for D after the signal ?? and voting for R after the signal ??. All other
combinations of D , R,and ? are similarly de?ned. For example, DD denotes always voting for D ,
while ?R denotes abstaining after ?? and voting for R after ??.
We study pure-strategy symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibria of this game. A symmetric Bayesian
Nash equilibrium is a pro?le of identical strategies (? ?? ? ?), one for each voter, such that no voter
5 In Section 6 we relax the assumption of bounded derivatives and show that our results remain essentially
unchanged.
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has a strictly pro?table, unilateral deviation.
4 Solving the Model
To solve the model, we proceed in two steps. First, we derive a voter’s optimal choice of news
outlet conditional on his voting strategy. This gives rise to a set of “indirect” utility functions, one
for each voting strategy. Then we compare these indirect utility functions and, for each ?, identify
the voting strategy that generates the highest payo?. Of course, the complication we have to deal
with is that voters’ payo?s not only depend on their priors, their choice of news outlet, and their
voting strategy, but also on the ratios of pivotal probabilities, which are determined in equilibrium.
The remainder of this section is organized as follows. In Section 4.1 we study pivotal events and
probabilities. In Section 4.2 we derive the optimal choice of news outlet for each voting strategy.
Finally, in Section 4.3 we compare indirect utilities and characterize equilibrium voting behavior.
4.1 Pivotal Events and Probabilities
A rational voter anticipates that his decision at the ballot box only a?ects his payo? when it changes
the outcome of the election. Hence, when deciding how to vote, he conditions on being pivotal.
When comparing a vote for D with abstaining, the relevant pivotal events are that R is leading
by one vote or that the two candidates are tied. When R is leading by one vote, a vote for D
rather than abstaining throws the election into a tie and, hence, raises the probability that D wins
by 50%. When the candidates are tied, a vote for D hands the election to D and, therefore, also
raises D ’s probability of winning by 50%. The payo? comparison of voting for R versus abstaining
is analogous. In that case, the pivotal events are that D is leading by one vote or that the two
candidates are tied. Either way, a vote for R rather than ? raises R’s chances by 50%. Finally,
when comparing a vote for D with a vote for R, the pivotal events consist of all of the above, i.e., R
is leading by one vote, D and R are tied, or D is leading by one vote. Notice that when a candidate
is leading by one vote, the shift in winning probabilities induced by a vote for R rather than D is
once more 50%. By contrast, when the two candidates are tied, a vote for R instead of D shifts
the election from a sure win for R to a sure win for D .
For a given pro?le of symmetric strategies (?? ? ), we now derive expressions for the probabilities
of the various pivotal events. Denote by ?D (?) the probability that a randomly drawn voter, who
may be partisan or non-partisan, casts a vote for D in state ?. Denote by ?D (?) the total number
of votes for D in state ?. Let ?R (?) and ?R (?) be similarly de?ned. As proved by Myerson
(2000), ?D (?) and ?R (?) are independently distributed Poisson random variables with expectation
parameters ??D (?) and ??R (?). The memorylessness of the Poisson distribution implies that, from
the perspective of a given voter ?, ?D (?) and ?R (?) also describe the number of votes for D and
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R cast by all other voters. From ?’s perspective, the pivotal events in state ? correspond to
|?D (?)? ?R (?)| ? 1, i.e., situations where, after all others have cast their votes, one candidate
leads by at most one vote.
Let ? ? (?) denote the probability that D leads by ? ? Z votes. The probabilities of the three
pivotal events are then ??1 (?), ? 0 (?), and ? 1 (?). Because ? ? (?) is Poisson distributed, we have
??1 (?) = ???(?R(?)+?D (?))
?X
?=0
(??D (?))?
?!
(??R (?))?+1
(?+ 1)!
The expressions for ? 0 (?), and ? 1 (?) are analogous.
Denote the set of all pivotal probabilities by ? , i.e., ? ?
(
??1 (?) ? ? 0 (?) ? ? 1 (?) ?
??1 (?) ? ? 0 (?) ? ? 1 (?)
)
. Partisan
voters guarantee that ?D (?), ?R (?) ? 0. This implies that every vote count, (?D ? ?R), has strictly
positive probability of occurring. As pivotal events are nothing but collections of particular vote
counts, ? is strictly interior, i.e., ?? (0? 1)6. Finally, for future reference, let e??1 (?) ? ? 0 (?) +
??1 (?) and e? 1 (?) ? ? 0 (?) + ? 1 (?).
4.2 Demand for Slant Conditional on Voting Strategy
In this section, we derive voters’ optimal choice of news outlet conditional on their voting strategy.
First, notice that only DD ? D?? DR? ??? ?R? and RR are viable voting strategies. The remaining
strategies, RD , ?D and R?, entail the “reversing” of signals. Because signals are informative,
such strategies are dominated and, hence, not played in equilibrium. Next, notice that a voter who
optimally uses one of the unresponsive voting strategies, DD ? ??? or RR, is indi?erent between
all news outlets and, thus, by assumption, chooses not to consult one. Therefore, it only remains
to determine the optimal choice of news outlet for voters using D?, DR, or ?R. We denote these
optimal outlets by ?D?? (?), ?DR? (?), and ??R? (?), respectively.
Conditional on playing DR, a voter’s expected payo? is
???? (DR) = ? (?)?
½μ
1? 1
2
??
¶
? 1 (?) + (1? ??)? 0 (?) +
1
2
(1? ??)??1 (?)
¾
? (6)
?
½
1
2
(1?? (??))? 1 (?) + (1?? (??))? 0 (?) +
μ
1? 1
2
? (??)
¶
??1 (?)
¾
(1? ?)
The ?rst term, ? (?), incorporates the expected payo?s (i.e., losses) associated with all non-pivotal
events. By de?nition, these payo?s do not depend on the voter’s choice of news media or voting
strategy. The remaining terms incorporate the payo?s associated with all pivotal events. Consider,
for instance, the last term on the ?rst line of (6), i.e., 12 (1? ??)??1 (?) ?. Its interpretation is as
follows: The joint event that the state is ?, candidate R leads by one vote, and the voter receives
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the (wrong) signal ?? occurs with probability (1? ??)??1 (?) ?. As he is playing DR, the signal
?? makes the voter cast a ballot for D . This throws the election into a tie and, hence, leads to an
expected loss of one half. As a result, under DR, the contribution to the expected payo? of this
particular event is 12 (1? ??)??1 (?) ?. All other terms have analogous interpretations.
Di?erentiating ???? (DR) with respect to ?? and rearranging yields the ?rst-order condition
??0
¡
?DR?
¢
=
?˜?1 (?) + ?˜ 1 (?)
?˜?1 (?) + ?˜ 1 (?)
?
1? ? (7)
It is easily veri?ed that ???? (DR) is strictly concave in ??. Hence, there exists at most one ?DR?
that solves (7) and, at that ?DR? , the second-order condition for a maximum is satis?ed.
The ?rst-order condition can be easily understood in terms of cost-bene?t arguments. To see
this, rewrite (7) as
1
2
³
?˜?1 (?) + ?˜ 1 (?)
´
(1? ?) ·??? ¡?DR? ¢ = 12 ³?˜?1 (?) + ?˜ 1 (?)´ ? · ??DR?
On the right-hand side, we have the gain in expected payo?s induced by a marginal increase in
accuracy in state ?. This gain is equal to the joint probability that the state is ? and the vote is
pivotal times the expected gain from voting for R rather than D . On the left-hand side, we have
the loss in expected payo?s induced by a marginal decrease in accuracy in state ?, which is equal to
the joint probability that the state is ? and the vote is pivotal times the expected loss from voting
for R rather than D . Of course, when the choice of news outlet is optimal, the expected marginal
gains are equal to the expected marginal losses.
Because ?? is a probability, it is bounded between 0 and 1. De?ne DD?DR to be the type ? such
that the solution to the ?rst-order condition (7) just reaches its lower bound, ?DR? = 0. Similarly,
let DR?RR be the type ? such that the solution to (7) just reaches its upper bound, ?DR? = 1. In
other words, DD?DR and DR?RR are the transition types where DR degenerates into DD and RR,
respectively. Solving (7) for ? reveals that
DD?DR =
??0 (0)
?˜?1(?)+?˜ 1(?)
?˜?1(?)+?˜ 1(?) + (??
0 (0))
and DR?RR =
??0 (1)
?˜?1(?)+?˜ 1(?)
?˜?1(?)+?˜ 1(?) + (??
0 (1))
(8)
Hence, the transition types DD?DR and DR?RR exist, are unique, and are strictly interior. Moreover,
because ??0 (0) ? ??0 (1), we have DD?DR ? DR?RR. Recalling that ? and ???? (DR) are strictly
concave in ??, we may conclude that
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?DR? (?) =
?
??
??
0 for ? ? [0?DD ?DR]
(?0)?1
³
? ?˜
?1(?)+?˜1(?)
?˜?1(?)+?˜1(?)
?
1??
´
for ? ? (DD?DR?DR ?RR)
1 for ? ? [DR?RR? 1]
(9)
When playing DR, a voter with beliefs ? su?ciently close to 0 maximizes his utility by “cornering
out” and choosing ?DR? (?) = 0. Hence, such a voter is, in e?ect, playing DD . Similarly, a voter with
? su?ciently close to 1 maximizes his utility by choosing ?DR? (?) = 1 and, in e?ect, playing RR.
For these voters, there simply do not exist media outlets whose signals are su?ciently convincing
to overcome their strong prior beliefs.
Along the same lines, we ?nd that ?D?? (?) and ??R? (?) are equal to6
?D?? (?) =
?
??
???
0 if ? ? [0?DD ?D?]
(?0)?1
³
? ?˜
?1(?)
?˜?1(?)
?
1??
´
if ? ? (DD?D??D? ???)
1 if ? ? [D????? 1]
(10)
??R? (?) =
?
??
??
0 if ? ? [0??? ??R]
(?0)?1
³
? ?˜
1(?)
?˜ 1(?)
?
1??
´
if ? ? (????R??R ?RR)
1 if ? ? [?R?RR? 1]
(11)
Here, the transition types {DD?D??D? ???} and {????R??R ?RR} are the analogues of the transition
types {DD?DR?DR?RR}. They correspond to the points where the responsive voting strategies D?
and ?R degenerate into the unresponsive voting strategies DD , ??, and RR. Closed-form solutions
can be found in Lemma 6 in the Appendix.
Implicitly di?erentiating the ?rst-order conditions with respect to ? reveals that, in the interior,
?DR? (?), ?D?? (?), and ??R? (?) are strictly increasing in ?. Hence, for a given voting strategy, the
demand for slant is monotone in ideology. The intuition is essentially the same as in Calvert (1985)
and Suen (2004). The more the decision maker leans toward one candidate, the stronger evidence
he needs in order to vote for the other candidate (or to abstain). Such strong evidence can only be
provided by information sources that share his bias.
Having derived voters’ preferred demand for slant for a given voting strategy, we now compare
the demand for slant across voting strategies. As is evident from (9), (10) and (11), the comparison
between ?DR? (?), ?D?? (?), and ??R? (?) crucially hinges on the equilibrium values of the ratios of
pivotal probability, ?˜
?1(?)+?˜ 1(?)
?˜?1(?)+?˜ 1(?) ,
???1(?)
???1(?) , and
?? 1(?)
??1(?) . In the next lemma we show that, for large
electorates, these ratios can be unambiguously ranked.
6Expressions for ???? (D?) and ?
??
? (?R) can be found in Remark 1 in the Appendix. The corresponding ?rst-
order conditions for ?D?? (?) and ??R? (?) can be found in Lemma 5.
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Lemma 1 For ? su?ciently large, in equilibrium,
e? 1 (?)e? 1 (?) ? ?˜
1 (?) + ?˜?1 (?)
?˜ 1 (?) + ?˜?1 (?)
?
e??1 (?)e??1 (?)
Lemma 1 is intuitive. To see this, notice that
?? 1(?)
?? 1(?) ?
???1(?)
???1(?) is equivalent to
?? 1(?)
???1(?) ?
?? 1(?)
???1(?) .
In essence, the latter inequality merely states that, comparing across states, the relative likelihood
of D leading by one vote versus R leading by one vote is greater in state ? than in state ?. In turn,
this is a consequence of the positive correlation between votes and signals and between signals and
states. Finally, the fact that ?˜
1(?)+?˜?1(?)
?˜ 1(?)+?˜?1(?) lies in between
?? 1(?)
?? 1(?) and
???1(?)
???1(?) is simply an arithmetic
necessity.7
In combination with (9), (10) and (11), Lemma 1 implies:
Lemma 2 Suppose ?D?? (?), ?DR? (?) and ??R? (?) are strictly interior. For ? su?ciently large, in
equilibrium,
?D?? (?) ? ?DR? (?) ? ??R? (?)
The result is immediate and a formal proof is omitted. Intuitively, a voter is relatively more
concerned about certainty after the signal ?? when he is playing D? than when he is playing ?R.
Conversely, he is relatively more concerned about certainty after the signal ?? when he is playing
?R than when he is playing D?. As a result, the voter consults a more R-leaning news outlet
under D? than under ?R. When playing DR, his concerns about certainty after ?? and ?? are
more balanced, which translates in consulting a paper with intermediate bias.
4.3 Equilibrium Voting Behavior
In the previous section, we have derived voters’ optimal choice of news outlet for a given voting
strategy. It remains to compare the induced indirect utilities across voting strategies and, for each
?, determine which voting strategy yields the highest payo?. In addition, we must prove that an
equilibrium, (? ?? ? ?), indeed exists.
As we show below, equilibrium voting strategies can take on one of two forms, which only di?er
in whether DR is played. When DR is played, voting behavior is the same as in the example in
Section 2. It moves from DD for beliefs ? close to zero, to D?, to DR, to ?R and, ?nally, to RR for
beliefs ? close to 1. With some abuse of notation, we write ? ? = DD ;D?;DR;?R;RR to denote an
7As shown by Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996, 1999), voters with posterior beliefs ? such that ??
1(?)
??1(?) ?
?
1?? ?
???1(?)
???1(?) su?er from the Swing Voters’ Curse. That is, whichever candidate they vote for, these voters are more likely
to push the election in the wrong direction than in the right direction. Hence, they are strictly better o? abstaining.
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equilibrium voting strategy of this form. When DR is not played, ? ? = DD ;D?;?R;RR. Hence,
the voting strategy ?? is never played in equilibrium.
More formally, DD ;D?;DR;?R;RR and DD ;D?;?R;RR are de?ned as follows. Denote by
??DD the set of voters ? for whom, in equilibrium, the voting strategy DD is a best response, and let
the sets ???? and ??RR be analogously de?ned. Also, denote by ??DR the set of voters for whom DR
is a best response while consulting a strictly interior news outlet 0 ? ?DR? (?) ? 1, and let ??D? and
???R be de?ned along the same lines.8 We say that a set is strictly smaller than another set (?) if
almost all elements in the former are strictly smaller than almost all elements in the latter. We say
that a set is strictly smaller than a scalar (also using “?”) if almost all elements in the set are strictly
smaller than the scalar. “Strictly greater” is analogously de?ned. ? ? = DD ;D?;DR;?R;RR then
means that ??DD , ??D?, ??DR, ???R, and ??RR are ordered intervals with non-empty interiors that
partition the type space [0? 1]. That is,
0 ? ??DD ? ??D? ? ??DR ? ???R ? ??RR ? 1
and
??DD ???D? ???DR ????R ???RR = [0? 1]
The only di?erence with ? ? = DD ;D?;?R;RR is that, in this case, ??DR has an empty interior.
In the next proposition, we prove existence of equilibrium and formally characterize equilibrium
voting strategies.
Proposition 1 There exists a pure-strategy symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium, (? ?? ? ?). For
? su?ciently large, the equilibrium voting strategy, ? ?, takes on one of two forms:
1) DD ;D?;DR;?R;RR 2) DD ;D?;?R;RR?
To understand why ?? is never played in equilibrium, notice that abstention is a best response
if and only if a voter’s posterior belief, ?, satis?es ??
1(?)
?? 1(?) ?
?
1?? ?
???1(?)
???1(?) .
9 For ?? to be optimal, the
voter’s posterior must lie within these bounds after both signals. This is only possible if the prior,
?, also lies within these bounds. In other words, the voter must 1) have a centrist prior and 2) read
a centrist paper that conveys little information after both signals. Notice, however, that such a
voter can pro?tably deviate by consulting a strongly biased news outlet and play D? or ?R. Most
of the time, he will receive a signal that conforms to the outlet’s bias. In that case, he continues to
abstain. Sometimes, however, he will receive a signal that goes against the outlet’s bias. Provided
8We insist on strict interiority of ?DR? (?) in the de?nition ??DR to avoid overlap of ??DR with ??DD and ??RR. With-
out this additional requirement, signi?cant but spurious overlap would occur because DR reduces to DD whenever
?DR? (?) = 0, while it reduces to RR when ?DR? (?) = 1. Similar issues would arise with ??D? and ???R.
9See Lemma 7 in the Appendix for a formal proof of this claim.
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the bias is su?ciently strong, a contrarian signal will push the voter’s posterior belief outside the
narrow band where abstention is optimal, such that the voter now wants to follow the signal. As
this deviation allows the voter to use his information at least some of the time, he is strictly better
o? than under the strategy of always abstaining.10
The proof of existence follows along the lines of Oliveros (2013). Rather than directly searching
for a ?xed point in the space of best responses, we search for a ?xed point in the space of pivotal
probabilities. The idea is that any collection of pivotal probabilities gives rise to a pro?le of best
responses which, in turn, gives rise to a collection of pivotal probabilities. We then show that
best responses are continuous functions of pivotal probabilities and vice versa. Hence, the implied
mapping of pivotal probabilities into itself is also continuous and we can apply Brouwer’s ?xed-
point theorem. This gives us a ?xed point in pivotal probabilities, which corresponds to a ?xed
point in the space of best responses, i.e., an equilibrium.
5 Demand for Slant
Having characterized equilibrium voting behavior, we now study the implications for the demand for
slant. Technically, the primary result of this section is to show that the demand for slant is a non-
monotone and discontinuous function of ideology, ?. The economically relevant implication is that
abstention breaks ideological segregation and induces ideological moderation in news consumption.
Speci?cally:
1) Voters with considerable leanings toward a candidate consult a news outlet that is less biased
toward that candidate than other, intrinsically more centrist voters.
2) Some voters with almost identical beliefs optimally consult news outlets with very di?erent
ideologies, while voters with very di?erent beliefs consult outlets with the same ideology. As a result,
the electorate does not segregate along ideological lines and voters’ beliefs and voting behavior are
non-recoverable from their choice of news outlet.
3) Centrist or moderately biased news outlets serve multiple constituencies who use the same
information in di?erent ways. As a result, these outlets bene?t from disproportionate demand.
4) When the electorate becomes more polarized, its choice of news outlets may become ideo-
logically more moderate.
First, we establish the non-monotonicity and discontinuity of the demand for slant. When
? ? = DD ;D?;DR;?R;RR, there exists a unique type, D??DR, where ? ? switches from D? to
10Because ?? is not played in equilibrium, voters only abstain as part of a responsive strategy. Hence, abstainers
are not “uninformed,” in the sense that they have, in fact, consulted a news outlet. Cf. Feddersen (2004): “Because
uninformed independents abstain and informed independents vote, [Feddersen (2004)] provides an informational
explanation for why better educated individuals are more likely to vote.”
The lesson is that, if the media landscape is su?ciently broad, the association between abstaining and being
uninformed breaks down.
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Figure 2: Demand for slant as a function of ? (schematic), under compulsory and voluntary voting.
DR. From Lemma 2 we know that ?D?? (?) ? ?DR? (?). Hence, at D??DR, the demand for slant
is non-monotone and discontinuous: a voter with beliefs slightly to the right of D??DR optimally
consults a news outlet that is discontinuously more left-leaning than a voter slightly to the left of
D??DR. The intuition is that, upon receiving a signal that contradicts his prior, the former plans
on voting against his prior, while the latter merely abstains. This makes the more right-leaning
voter signi?cantly more concerned about certainty after signal ?? than the more left-leaning voter.
As a result, the right-leaning voter consults a more left-leaning news outlet than the left-leaning
voter. At the other side of the ideological spectrum, the analogous phenomenon occurs: a voter
with beliefs slightly to the left of the unique crossing point DR??R between DR and ?R optimally
consults a news outlet that is signi?cantly more right-leaning than a voter slightly to the right of
that point.
When ? ? = DD ;D?;?R;RR, there exists a unique type, D???R, where ? ? switches from D?
to ?R. Lemma 2 implies that ?D?? (D???R) ? ??R? (D???R). Hence, also at D???R, the demand
for slant is non-monotone and discontinuous.
We summarize these observations in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 When voters have the option to abstain, the demand for slant is a non-monotone
and discontinuous function of prior beliefs ?. Non-monotone discontinuities occur at transition
points between responsive voting strategies, i.e., D??DR, DR??R, and D???R.
Schematically, the demand for slant as a function of ? is illustrated in the center and right
panels of Figure 2. In the interior of ??D?, ??DR, and ???R, the demand for slant is continuous
and monotone in ?. This follows from the continuity and monotonicity of ?DR? (?), ?D?? (?), and
??R? (?). To the left of DD?D?, voters do not consult a news outlet, as no outlet can dissuade them
from voting according to their prior. Just to right of DD?D?, voters do consult a news outlet and,
nominally, follow the responsive voting strategy D?. However, their preferred outlet has a ?? so
21
close to zero that they almost always receive the signal ??. In practice, this makes their voting
behavior almost indistinguishable from that of voters to left of DD?D?, who do not consult a news
outlet at all. Moving farther to the right, voting becomes more responsive, as voters following the
voting strategy D? begin to consult more centrist outlets. This continues until we reach either
D??DR or D???R. At D??DR, the optimal ?? jumps down from ?D?? (D??DR) to ?DR? (D??DR) (center
panel). At D???R, the optimal ?? jumps down from ?D?? (D???R) to ??R? (D???R) (right panel).
On the right side of the political spectrum, behavior is analogous.
What are the implications of voters’ demand for slant for ideological segregation in news con-
sumption and for the demand faced by news outlets across the ideological spectrum? As illustrated
in Figure 2 (left panel), under compulsory voting, each outlet has a single constituency that, roughly
speaking, shares the outlet’s ideology. As a result, voters are perfectly ideologically segregated in
their news consumption, and the demand for a particular news outlet is roughly proportional to
the number (density) of voters with the same ideology as the outlet. Under voluntary voting, by
contrast, some news outlets serve two constituencies. When ? ? = DD ;D?;DR;?R;RR, moder-
ately biased outlets have readers who follow the outlet’s signal in both directions, as well as readers
who follow the signal only when it con?rms their prior and abstain otherwise (Figure 2, center
panel). The former more or less share the outlet’s ideology, while the latter are ideologically more
extreme. The situation for moderately right-leaning news outlets is analogous. When ? ? is of
the form DD ;D?;?R;RR, it is centrist outlets that serve multiple constituencies, each of whom
follows the outlet’s signal in one direction only (right panel).
Finally, notice that polarization of the electorate may cause ideological moderation in news con-
sumption. Consider an equilibrium voting strategy of the form DD ;D?;DR;?R;RR and, for some
? ? 0, transfer probability mass from the interval (D??DR? D??DR + ?) to (D??DR ? ?? D??DR) and
from (DD??R ? ?? DD??R) to (DD??R? DD??R + ?). Clearly, this makes the electorate more polar-
ized. However, news consumption becomes more moderate, as voters the left of D??DR consult more
centrist outlets than voters to the right of D??DR, and voters to the right of DD??R consult more cen-
trist outlets than voters to the left of DD??R. When ? ? is of the form DD ;D?;?R;RR, a similar ef-
fect occurs when we transfer probability mass from (D???R ? ?? D???R) to (D???R ? 2?? D???R ? ?)
and from (D???R? D???R + ?) to (D???R + ?? D???R + 2?).11
We may conclude:
11Somewhat paradoxically, the electorate is better informed under voluntary than under compulsory voting, in
the sense that more voters consult a news outlet. To see this, notice that types ? ? (DD?D? ? DD?DR) only consult an
outlet when they have the option to abstain, but remain uninformed when they must cast a ballot. Intuitively, the
option to abstain allows for more “nuanced” voting behavior, which increases the value of information. On a more
technical level, recall that the swing voter’s curse implies that a voter who is indi?erent between D and R strictly
prefers to abstain. This implies that, at DD?DR, the voting strategy D? does strictly better than both DD and DR.
As the payo? di?erence between DD and D? is decreasing in ?, the indi?erence point between D? and DD must lie
strictly to the left of DD?DR. For the same reason, ?R?RR ? DR?RR.
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Proposition 3 When voters have the option to abstain, strict ideological segregation in news con-
sumption breaks down. As a result, centrist or moderately biased news outlets bene?t from dispro-
portionate demand.
Polarization of the electorate may cause ideological moderation in news consumption.
Political commentators fear that the polarization of the electorate, in combination with voters’
new-found ability to customize their news consumption, induces them to live in information cocoons
and self-segregate along ideological lines (Sunstein (2002), Sunstein (2009), and Brooks (2010).).
Proposition 3 suggests that, at least for rational voters, this fear is overblown.
6 Extensions and Limitations
In this section, we discuss some extensions and limitations of our model.
Non-monotone Elasticities So far, we have assumed that the elasticities ??? ?1??? and
????1??? are strictly increasing in ?? and ??, respectively. We now study what happens when
we relax this assumption and merely assume that ? is strictly concave.
In the proof of Proposition 1, increasing elasticities served to establish single-crossing of the
indirect utility functions ?? (DR) and ?? (D?), as well as of ?? (DR) and ?? (?R). This guaranteed
that ??D?, ??DR, and ???R were connected intervals. Under mere concavity of ?, ??DD and ??RR
remain connected. However, in equilibria where DR is played, connectedness of ??D?, ??DR, and
???R may fail. That is, while the ordering of the in?ma and suprema of ??D?, ??DR, and ???R
remains unchanged, the sets themselves can no longer be fully ordered. As a result, as we increase
?, the equilibrium voting strategy may jump back and forth multiple times between D? and DR
on the left side of the political spectrum, and between DR and ?R on the right side.
Obviously, this loss of connectedness makes the characterization of equilibrium less elegant.
For the rest, our results remain essentially unchanged: equilibrium is still guaranteed to exist and
?? is never played. More importantly, the demand for slant continues to be a non-monotone and
discontinuous function of prior beliefs. Indeed, in the absence of connectedness, discontinuities in
the demand for slant occur at each and every one of the now potentially many transition points
between D? and DR, and between DR and ?R. Of these transitions, the ones from D? to DR
and from DR to ?R are non-monotone. By contrast, “reverse” transitions, i.e., from DR to D?
and from ?R to DR, are monotone. Finally, notice that when DR is not played, it does not matter
whether ????1??? and ????1??? are increasing.
Unbounded Likelihood Ratios Another assumption underlying our characterization of
equilibrium was that 0 ? ??0 (0) ? ??0 (1) ? ?. As we showed in Section 3, this means that
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there is a limit to how much can be learned from any signal from any news outlet. In other words,
even at the extremes, likelihood ratios remain bounded away from zero and in?nity.
With unbounded likelihood ratios (i.e., ??0 (0) = 0 and ??0 (1) =?), no matter how extreme
a voter’s (non-degenerate) prior beliefs, there always exists a su?ciently extreme news outlet whose
“non-conforming” signal contains so much information that it overcomes these priors. Even though
an extremist news outlet can be expected to send a non-conforming signal only extremely rarely, the
equally extremist voter is strictly better o? consulting this news outlet and voting DR, rather than
voting in accordance to his prior. In other words, DD and RR are dominated by DR. As a result,
only responsive voting strategies, i.e., D?, DR, and ?R, are played in equilibrium. Indeed, with
unbounded likelihood ratios, equilibrium voting strategies are of the form D?;DR;?R or D?;?R.
Hence, the demand for slant remains a non-monotone and discontinuous function of prior beliefs.
Multiple News Outlets and Non-binary Signals In our model, voters receive a signal
from, at most, one news outlet. By contrast, Gentzkow and Shapiro (2011) ?nd that many voters
choose to consult multiple outlets. This raises the question whether a rational voter receiving
signals from multiple outlets would ever cross over, or whether cross-over is an artifact of voters
receiving a single, binary signal. While a full analysis is complicated and beyond the scope of
this paper, the general principle underlying abstention-induced cross-over does generalize to voters
receiving multiple signals.12 To see this, recall that the discontinuities in the demand for slant
are caused by jumps from one responsive voting strategy to another. In the presence of multiple
signals, these jumps continue to exist and, in fact, multiply in number.
Suppose voters collect two conditionally independent signals. For simplicity, assume that both
signals have the same accuracy, ??. Denote by D?R the strategy of voting for ? upon receiving
two ?? signals, abstaining upon receiving one ?? and one ?? signal, and voting for ? upon receiving
two ?? signals. Other letter combinations are de?ned analogously. Now consider the pair of voting
strategies D?? and D?R, and let D???D?R denote the voter who, conditional on consulting optimal
news outlets, is indi?erent between D?? and D?R. After signals {??? ??}, a voter just to the right
of D???D?R votes for ? , while a voter just to the left of D???D?R merely abstains. In that case,
the former is relatively more concerned about certainty that the state is ? than the latter. As this
is the only respect in which the two strategies di?er, a voter to the left of D???D?R playing D??
optimally consults a more right-leaning news outlet than a voter to the right of D???D?R playing
D?R .
An analogous argument reveals that cross-over in news consumption does not crucially depend
on the binariness of signals either. Suppose that voters are limited to consulting a single news outlet,
12Fuchs and Oliveros (2011) study the implications of sequential information on the demand for slant in a model
without abstention. They show that sequentiality also creates incentives for cross-over, albeit through a di?erent
mechanism.
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but that signals can take on three values, ??, ??, or ??. In state ?, news outlet ?? sends signal ??
with probability (1? ??)2, ?? with probability 2?? (1? ??), and ?? with probability ?2?. In state ?,
the chances of ??, ??, and ?? are ? (??)2, 2? (??) (1?? (??)), and (1?? (??))2, respectively. In
this set-up, D?R denotes the strategy of voting for ? upon receiving the signal ??, abstaining upon
receiving ??, and voting for ? upon receiving ??. Other letter combinations are similarly de?ned.
As this model is isomorphic to the two-signal model discussed above, a voter to the left of D???D?R
optimally consults a more right-leaning news outlet than a voter to the right of D???D?R.
Consumption Value We have assumed that voters’ utility from information is purely instru-
mental. However, for many people, news also provides consumption value. To construct a model
where voters enjoy news as a consumption good, we have to take a stand as to how it enters the
utility function. We have to determine whether the consumption value derives from the content of
the news–i.e., from receiving a particular signal–or whether it derives from the bias of the outlet
that provides it. For example, a voter may derive pleasure from hearing that the Republican can-
didate should be elected, or he may derive pleasure from listening to a news outlet whose reporting
tends to coincides with what he believes. In the ?rst case, it does not matter whether a particular
signal is reported by CNN or Fox News. In the second case, listening to CNN provides di?erent
utility from listening to Fox News, independently of what is reported. In addition, we would have
to decide how the consumption value interacts with the informational value of news.
Suppose that the consumption value of news is separable from its informational value and
derives from receiving a signal that conforms to one’s biases. Then it is easy to show that, in large
elections, voters only consult the most extreme media outlets. The reason is simple and similar to
Morgan and Várdy (2012). In large elections, the probability of being pivotal is negligible. Hence,
the instrumental value of information disappears. Voters now face the simple task of selecting the
news outlet that most often provides their preferred signal. Of course, this outlet lies at one of the
extremes of the ideological spectrum. Clearly, this is an unsatisfactory prediction. We leave a more
thorough analysis for future research.
Unknown Biases Finally, we have also assumed that voters perfectly know the biases of
all news media. While, in practice, voters are roughly aware of the slants of the various media
outlets, they may not know how strong these biases are exactly. Hence, one may wonder whether
our results carry over to an environment with incomplete information about the precise slants of
media outlets.
While we have not undertaken a formal analysis, uncertainty about the bias of media outlets
should not a?ect our main result, i.e., the non-monotonicity and discontinuity of the demand for
slant. The reason is that the fundamental cause of the discontinuity–namely, the discrete change in
the shape of a voter’s payo? function upon a jump from one responsive voting strategy to another–
25
remains present. Also, the direction of the jump should remain una?ected, as it remains true that
a voter who switches from D? to DR (say) suddenly cares relatively more about certainty after the
signal ??. As a result, he now prefers to consult a news outlet that, in expectation, is more biased
toward D .
7 Literature Review
We now put our ?ndings in the context of the extant literature. In recent years, there has been
considerable work analyzing the demand for news and its impact on political outcomes (see, e.g.,
DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2010) and Prat and Stromberg (2010)). In a decision theoretic environ-
ment, Calvert (1985) and Suen (2004) show that rational agents optimally demand information that
is biased toward their priors. In Oliveros and Vardy (2011), we show that this result extends to the
strategic environment of elections with compulsory voting. Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) provide
an additional rationale for voters’ apparent con?rmatory bias. In their model, voters are not only
uncertain about the state of the world, but also about the quality of the various media outlets. As
a consequence, outlets that provide information conforming to voters’ prior beliefs are thought to
be of higher quality. This gives news media an incentive to pander to the biases and prior beliefs
of voters. In our model, we have shown that the media want to pander to a belief distribution that
di?ers from the belief distribution of the population at large. By adopting a centrist or moderately
biased position, a news outlet can generate disproportionate demand for its services. Hence, we
would expect to see “bunching” in these areas.13
The assumption of rational con?rmation bias has been used extensively in reduced-form mod-
elling of voters’ demand for information. Examples are Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) and Baron
(2006), who study competition in the market for news via di?erentiation in price and slant; Chan
and Suen (2008), who look at political competition; Krasa et al. (2008), who consider the impact
of media bias on election outcomes; and Duggan and Martinelli (2011) and Gul and Pesendorfer
(2011), who analyze economic policy selection and optimal slant.
Papers such as Strömberg (2004), DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007), Chiang and Knight (2011),
Gerber et al. (2007), Gerber et al. (2009), Enikolopov et al. (2011), and Durante and Knight
(2012) study whether news media a?ect voting behavior. They ?nd some evidence to that e?ect.
However, the ideological leanings of media outlets and their customers are not as closely correlated
as one might expect. Indeed, Gentzkow and Shapiro (2011) show that news consumption is less
ideologically segregated than predicted by existing theories. Similar results were found in surveys
by Pew (2008) and Pew (2009). The contribution of our paper is to uncover a fundamental rationale
for this imperfect segregation in news consumption.
13Besley and Prat (2006) study an altogether di?erent source of media bias. They argue that the government’s
desire to control the ?ow of information can induce media bias by capture.
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Our paper is closely related to the literatures on abstention and information acquisition in
voting. Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996) and Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1999) show that voters
who are (close to) indi?erent between supporting either one of two candidates su?er from a “Swing
Voter’s Curse.” This gives these voters a strict incentive to abstain. Oliveros (2013) studies the
incentives to abstain when information acquisition is endogenous and costly. Martinelli (2006)
and Martinelli (2007) also allow for endogenous information acquisition and study the information
aggregation properties of elections. In our model, information always aggregates in the limit.14 In
that regard, our paper is more concerned with political segregation and the challenges of studying
the industrial organization of media markets, than with the e?ect of media bias on the accuracy of
elections.
Finally, our paper is related to the literature on learning from coarse information. The afore-
mentioned articles by Calvert (1985) and Suen (2004) are important references. Bøg (2008) studies
a decision maker who can observe the binary choices of other experimenters, but not the actual
outcomes of their experiments. He discusses how priors, preferences and coarseness of observation
interact, such that the decision maker sometimes chooses to observe experimenters with di?erent
preferences. Gill and Sgroi (2012) study a company about to launch a new product. It can publicly
test the product and condition its price on whether the product passes or fails. The ability to adjust
the price in response to the outcome of the test reinforces the positive e?ect of passing, and miti-
gates the negative e?ect of failing. This convexi?es the ?rm’s pro?ts and induces the ?rm to select
either the softest or the hardest test. Closer to our paper, Meyer (1991) studies how an employer
can optimally generate and use coarse information in promotion decisions that are governed by a
sequence of rank-order contests. If the employer can choose not to promote anyone, Meyer (1991)
shows that, for purely informational reasons, it may be optimal to handicap the early leader in the
?nal-period contest. This handicapping can be interpreted as a kind of “cross-over” on the part of
the employer: despite being positively disposed toward the early leader, the employer chooses to
stack the ?nal contest against him. The early leader is promoted only if he wins the ?nal contest.
Otherwise, no one is promoted.
8 Conclusions
In most elections, voters have the option to stay away from the polls. As we have shown, this
seemingly innocuous fact has interesting and perhaps surprising implications for the kind of news
media that rational voters choose to consult. In particular, voters with relatively pronounced lean-
ings toward either side of the political spectrum optimally consult more centrist news outlets than
other, intrinsically more centrist voters. As a result, relatively centrist outlets bene?t from dispro-
14A proof is available from the authors upon request.
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portionate demand for their services, serving multiple constituencies who use the same information
in di?erent ways.
What do our ?ndings imply for the risk that voters self-segregate along strict ideological lines
and end up living in information cocoons? We have shown that rigid ideological segregation is an
artifact of compulsory voting, which breaks down when voters have the option to abstain. Because
centrist voters naturally demand “balanced” reporting, while more moderately biased voters tend
to consult news media whose ideological positions are more centrist than their own, rigid ideological
segregation is con?ned to the fringes of the political spectrum. Indeed, our theoretical results are
roughly consistent with recent empirical evidence, which suggests that there is far more “cross-over”
in news consumption than commonly believed (see Gentzkow and Shapiro (2011)).
While voluntary voting reduces ideological segregation and induces ideological moderation in
news consumption, it does induce more polarization at the ballot box. That is, under voluntary
voting, people who show up at the polls hold more extreme (posterior) beliefs than the population
at large. To see why, recall that voters who receive signals that conform to their bias will go and
vote. By contrast, voters who receive signals that go against their bias are more likely to stay home
and abstain. As a consequence, abstainers tend to hold more moderate beliefs than active voters
and the population at large.
In order to study the demand for slant, in this paper, we have assumed an exogenous supply of
slant. We believe that this is a crucial step in developing a sensible model of the market for political
news, which needs to account for the forces presented here. Informed by our ?nding that centrist
or moderately biased media bene?t from disproportionate demand, the next step is to endogenize
the supply of slant by allowing media outlets to position themselves strategically. Media might be
concerned with their circulation, with in?uencing the outcome of the election, or with both. We
leave this for future research..
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A Micro-foundation for ?
In this Appendix, we provide a micro-foundation for the accuracy function, ?. Speci?cally, we show
that accuracy functions with the assumed properties naturally arise when media outlets observe
a continuous signal that they coarsen into a binary voting recommendation using some threshold
rule, ? . (See also Suen (2004).)
Suppose that the states of nature ? = ?, ?, are associated with 0 and ?, respectively, where ? is
some strictly positive constant. Each news outlet observes a conditionally independent, continuous
signal ? ? R equal to the true state plus noise, i.e., ? = ? + ?. Noise ?, which is independent of
?, is described by a CDF ? on R that admits a well-behaved PDF ?. Speci?cally, ? is strictly
positive, di?erentiable, and single-peaked around zero. A news outlet with threshold rule ? sends
signal ?? if and only if ? ? ? , and ?? otherwise. Each threshold, ? , implies a pair of accuracies
(?? (?) ? ?? (?)) ? [0? 1]2, where ?? (?) = ? (?) and ?? = 1?? (? ? ?). There is a continuum of such
media outlets, one for each ? ? R. The implied accuracy function, ?˜, is then
?˜ (??) = ?
¡
? +??1 (1? ??)
¢
(12)
As an illustration, in the next example we derive the accuracy function implied by Logistic
noise.
Example 1 Let ? = 1. If ? is Logistically distributed with precision ?, then the implied accuracy
function is
?˜ (??) =
1
1 + 1??
??
1???
In the main text, we have assumed that the accuracy function ? : [0? 1] ? [0? 1] is a strictly
decreasing, strictly concave, and twice continuously di?erentiable bijection with 0 ? ??0 (0) ?
??0 (1) ??. (See Assumption 1.) It is easily veri?ed that the implied accuracy function in (12) is
indeed strictly decreasing and twice continuously di?erentiable. Moreover, ?˜ runs from ?˜ (0) = 1
to ?˜ (1) = 0, such that it is a bijection.
The following proposition establishes that strict concavity of ?˜ corresponds to strict log-
concavity of the noise density ?. Recall that the densities of many standard distributions, including
the Normal, the Logistic, and the Extreme Value distribution, satisfy strict log-concavity. (See,
e.g., Bergstrom and Bagnoli (2005).)
Proposition 4 ?˜ is strictly concave for all ? if and only if ? is strictly log-concave.
Proof. Because ?˜ (??) = ?
¡
? +??1 (1? ??)
¢
, we have
?˜00 (??) = ?
??0 (? + ?) + ?(?+?)?(?) ?
0 (?)
(? (?))2
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where ? = ??1 (1? ??). This expression is strictly negative, such that ?˜ is strictly concave, i?
? (? + ?)?0 (?) ? ? (?)?0 (? + ?) (13)
If ? = 0 then, by di?erentiability and single-peakedness around zero, ?0 (?) = 0 and ?0 (? + ?) ?
0. Hence, (13) holds.
If ? ? 0? then ?0 (?) ? 0 and ?0 (? + ?) ? 0. In that case, (13) is equivalent to
? ln (? (?))
?? ?
? ln (? (? + ?))
?? (14)
This inequality holds for all ? ? 0 i? ? is log-concave.
Next, suppose that ? ? 0, such that ?0 (?) ? 0. If ?0 (? + ?) ? 0, (13) holds for sure. If
?0 (? + ?) ? 0, (13) is again equivalent to (14), such that strict log-concavity of ? is once more a
necessary and su?cient condition.
Let ?? denote the likelihood ratio,
?(???)
?(?) , between state ? and state ? conditional on signal ?.
Because ?˜0 (??) = ?
?(?+??1(1???))
?(??1(1???)) , we have that ?˜
0 (0) = ?1??? and ?˜0 (1) = ?1????. Hence,
the assumption ?? ? ?0 (1) ? ?0 (0) ? 0 corresponds to ?? remaining bounded when ? ? ?,
and bounded away from zero when ? ? ??. In other words, there is a limit to how much can
be learned from any signal from any news outlet. While the Logistic distribution satis?es this
property, the Normal distribution does not.15 With the Normal distribution in mind, in Section 6
we discussed what happens when ?? =? and ??? = 0–i.e., ??0 (1) =? and ??0 (0) = 0. As
we have seen, our results remain essentially unchanged.
In the baseline model, we also assumed that elasticities ????1??? and ????1??? are strictly increas-
ing. (See Assumption 2.) We now show that this corresponds to the PDF ? being more log-concave
than its CDF ? and DCDF 1??.
Denote by ?˜???1??? and ?˜???1??? the elasticities implied by ?˜. Then,
Lemma 3 ?˜?? ?1??? is strictly increasing in ?? ? (0? 1) for all ? if and only if ? is strictly more
log-concave than 1??. I.e.,
?2 ln? (?)
(??)2
? ?
2 ln (1?? (?))
(??)2
(15)
?˜???1??? is strictly increasing in ?? ? (0? 1) for all ? if and only if ? is strictly more log-concave
than ?. I.e.,
?2 ln? (?)
(??)2
? ?
2 ln? (?)
(??)2
(16)
Proof. ?˜?? ?1??? is strictly increasing in ?? ? (0? 1) i?
??˜0 (??)
1? ?˜ (??)
? ?˜
00 (??)
?˜0 (??)
? 1??
? 0
15The Extreme Value distribution constitutes a hybrid: ??? = 0, while ?? ??.
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In terms of ? and ?, this inequality can be written as
? (? + ?)
1?? (? + ?) ?
μ
?0 (?)
? (?) ?
?0 (? + ?)
? (? + ?)
¶
? ? (?)??
? 0
where ? = ??1 (1? ??).
Using that ?? = 1 ??
¡
??1 (1? ??)
¢
, the condition for ?˜?? ?1??? to be strictly increasing sim-
pli?es to
? (? + ?)
1?? (? + ?) ?
? (?)
1?? (?) ?
?0 (?)
? (?) ?
?0 (? + ?)
? (? + ?)
This inequality holds for all ? ? 0 i?
?
??
μ
? (?)
1?? (?)
¶
? ? ???
μ
?0 (?)
? (?)
¶
or, equivalently,
?2 ln (1?? (?))
(??)2
? ?
2 ln? (?)
(??)2
The proof for ?˜???1??? is analogous.
Finally, we show that Normal and Logistic noise distributions satisfy the log-concavity-ranking
conditions in Lemma 3–and, thus, generate strictly increasing elasticities–while the Extreme
Value distribution does not.
Proposition 5 Normal and Logistic noise distributions give rise to strictly increasing elasticities
?˜???1???, ?˜???1??? . The Extreme Value distribution does not.
Proof. Notice that, for symmetric densities, the conditions (15) and (16) coincide. This follows
from the fact that, under symmetry, ? (?) = 1?? (??). Hence, to prove the result for the Normal
and the Logistic distribution, it su?ces to check only one of these inequalities. Let us focus on the
?rst.
For the Logistic distribution with mean ? and scale parameter ?, the result is immediate:
?2 ln (1?? (?))
(??)2
= ? ?
?+?
?³
? ?? + ?
?
?
´2
?2
? ? 2?
?+?
?³
? ?? + ?
?
?
´2
?2
=
?2 ln? (?)
(??)2
For the Normal distribution with mean ? and standard deviation ?, we have
?2 ln? (?)
(??)2
= ? 1?2
while
?2 ln (1?? (?))
(??)2
= ? ???
? (?)
1?? (?) = ?
1
?
?
??
?
¡???
?
¢
1??
¡???
?
¢ = ? 1?2?0 (?)
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Here, ? (·) denotes the PDF of the Standard Normal distribution, ? (·) its CDF, and ? (?) its
hazard rate. The result now follows from the well-known fact that ?0 (?) ? 1.
Finally, for the (non-symmetric) Extreme Value distribution with location parameter ? and
scale parameter ?,
?2 ln? (?)
(??)2
=
?
???
?
?2 =
?2 ln? (?)
(??)2
Hence, the inequality (16) fails.
With the Extreme Value distribution in mind, in Section 6 we discussed what happens when
the elasticities ????1??? , ????1??? fail to be strictly increasing. We saw that, while the equilibrium
characterization becomes less elegant, our results remain essentially unchanged.
B Proofs
This Appendix contains formal proofs of claims and results presented in the main text of the paper.
B.1 Preliminaries
For future reference, in this section, we prove some useful properties of the ? function (Lemma 4);
provide expressions for the expected payo?s of the various voting strategies (Remark 1); list the
?rst-order conditions for the optimal choice of news outlet conditional on voting strategy (Lemma
5); and derive closed-form solutions for the various transition types, ?? ??? , where responsive
voting strategies degenerate into unresponsive voting strategies (Lemma 6).
Properties of ?
Lemma 4 The accuracy function, ?, has the following properties.
1. For all ?? ? (0? 1), ?? +? (??) ? 1
2. ??0 (0) ? 1 ? ??0 (1)
3. There exists a unique news outlet, ?˜ ? 12 , such that ? (?˜) = ?˜.
4. The ratios 1??(??)?? and
?(??)
1??? are strictly increasing in ?? ? (0? 1). For ?? ? 0, they take on
their in?ma ??0 (0) and 1, respectively. For ?? ? 1, they take on their suprema 1 and ??0 (1).
Proof. We prove the claims one by one.
Part 1: Let ? (??) = ?? + ? (??) and notice that 1) ? (0) = ? (1) = 1 and 2) ? is strictly
concave. Hence, for all ?? ? (0? 1), it must be that ? (??) ? 1. This proves the result.
Part 2: Suppose, by contradiction, that ??0 (0) ? 1. In a neighborhood of 0, concavity of ?
then implies ? (??) ? ? (0)??? = 1???. This contradicts the fact that, by Part 1, ??+? (??) ? 1
for all ?? ? (0? 1).
The proof that 1 ? ??0 (1) is analogous.
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Part 3: Let? (??) = ? (??)??? and notice that? (0) = 1 ? 0 ? ? (1) = ?1. By continuity of
? , there exists an interior ?˜ such that? (?˜) = 0, or, equivalently, ?˜ = ? (?˜). Because? 0 (??) ? 0,
?˜ is unique. Finally, by Part 1, ?˜+? (?˜) = 2?˜ ? 1. Hence, ?˜ ? 12 .
Part 4: Di?erentiating 1??(??)?? with respect to ?? yields
?
???
μ
1?? (??)
??
¶
=
??0 (??) ?? ? (1?? (??))
?2?
For ?? ? 0, the sign of ????
³
1??(??)
??
´
turns on the sign of ????0 (??)? (1?? (??)) and, for ?? ? 0,
the latter expression is strictly positive. To see this, notice that by strict concavity of ?
??0 (??) ?? ? (1?? (??)) ?
1?? (??)
??
?? ? (1?? (??)) = 0
Hence, 1??(??)?? is strictly increasing in ??, and takes on its in?mum for ?? ? 0 and its supremum for
?? = 1. Using L’Hôpital’s rule we ?nd that the in?mum is equal to ??0 (0), while the supremum
is equal to 1.
The proof for ?(??)1??? is analogous.
Expected Payo?s of Voting Strategies
Remark 1 The expected payo?s of the various voting strategies are
?? (DD) = ? (?)?
½μ
? 1 (?) + ? 0 (?) + 1
2
??1 (?)
¶
? + 1
2
??1 (?) (1? ?)
¾
?? (RR) = ? (?)?
½
1
2
? 1 (?) ? +
μ
1
2
? 1 (?) + ? 0 (?) + ??1 (?)
¶
(1? ?)
¾
?? (??) = ? (?)?
½μ
? 1 (?) + 1
2
? 0 (?)
¶
? +
μ
1
2
? 0 (?) + ??1 (?)
¶
(1? ?)
¾
??
DR
?
? (DR) = ? (?)?
½μ
1? 1
2
?DR?
¶
? 1 (?) +
¡
1? ?DR?
¢
? 0 (?) + 1
2
¡
1? ?DR?
¢
??1 (?)
¾
?
?
½
1
2
¡
1??
¡
?DR?
¢¢
? 1 (?) +
¡
1??
¡
?DR?
¢¢
? 0 (?)
+
¡
1? 12?
¡
?DR?
¢¢
??1 (?)
¾
(1? ?)
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??
D?
?
? (D?) = ? (?)?
½
? 1 (?) +
μ
1? 1
2
?D??
¶
? 0 (?) + 1
2
¡
1? ?D??
¢
??1 (?)
¾
?
?
½
1
2
¡
1??
¡
?D??
¢¢
? 0 (?) +
μ
1? 1
2
?
¡
?D??
¢¶
??1 (?)
¾
(1? ?)
??
?R
?
? (?R) = ? (?)?
½μ
1? 1
2
??R?
¶
? 1 (?) + 1
2
¡
1? ??R?
¢
? 0 (?)
¾
?
?
½
1
2
¡
1??
¡
??R?
¢¢
? 1 (?) +
μ
1? 1
2
?
¡
??R?
¢¶
? 0 (?) + ??1 (?)
¾
(1? ?)
Here, ? (?) incorporates the payo?s associated with all non-pivotal events.
Proof. Trivial.
First-order Conditions Conditional on Voting Strategies
Lemma 5 The ?rst-order conditions for ???? (?), ?? ? {D??DR??R}, to be optimal are
??0
¡
?DR?
¢
=
?˜?1 (?) + ?˜ 1 (?)
?˜?1 (?) + ?˜ 1 (?)
?
1? ? (17)
??0
¡
?D??
¢
=
?˜?1 (?)
?˜?1 (?)
?
1? ? (18)
??0
¡
??R?
¢
=
?˜ 1 (?)
?˜ 1 (?)
?
1? ? (19)
Proof. The result follows immediately from di?erentiating with respect to ? the relevant payo?
expressions given in Remark 1.
Transition Types ?? ???
Lemma 6 The unique and strictly interior transition types between responsive and unresponsive
voting strategies are
DD?D? =
??0 (0)
?˜?1(?)
?˜?1(?) ??
0 (0)
, DD?DR =
??0 (0)
?˜?1(?)+?˜ 1(?)
?˜?1(?)+?˜ 1(?) ??
0 (0)
, and ????R =
??0 (0)
?˜ 1(?)
?˜ 1(?) ??
0 (0)
D???? =
??0 (1)
?˜?1(?)
?˜?1(?) ??
0 (1)
, DR?RR =
??0 (1)
?˜?1(?)+?˜ 1(?)
?˜?1(?)+?˜ 1(?) ??
0 (1)
, and ?R?RR =
??0 (1)
?˜1(?)
?˜ 1(?) ??
0 (1)
Proof. The responsive strategy
¡
?DR? (?) ?DR
¢
degenerates into the unresponsive strategy DD at
type ? = DD?DR which solves the ?rst-order condition (7) for ?DR? = 0. That is,
??0 (0) = ?˜
?1 (?) + ?˜ 1 (?)
?˜?1 (?) + ?˜ 1 (?)
?
1? ?
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Solving for ?, we ?nd
DD?DR =
??0 (0)
?˜?1(?)+?˜ 1(?)
?˜?1(?)+?˜ 1(?) ??
0 (0)
The derivations of the other transition types are analogous.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 1
We now turn our attention to Lemma 1, which establishes that
??1(?)
?? 1(?) ?
?˜ 1(?)+?˜?1(?)
?˜1(?)+?˜?1(?) ?
???1(?)
???1(?) .
First, we determine when abstention is a strict best response.
Lemma 7 A voter with posterior belief ? that the state is ? strictly prefers to abstain if and only
if e? 1 (?)e? 1 (?) ? 1? ?? ? e?
?1 (?)e??1 (?)
Proof. The expected payo? of voting for D is
? (?)?
½μ
? 1 (?) + ? 0 (?) + 1
2
??1 (?)
¶
?+ 1
2
??1 (?) (1? ?)
¾
while the expected payo? of abstaining is
? (?)?
½μ
? 1 (?) + 1
2
? 0 (?)
¶
?+
μ
1
2
? 0 (?) + ??1 (?)
¶
(1? ?)
¾
Hence, the expected payo? from abstaining is strictly greater than from voting for D if and only if
1
2
¡
??1 (?) + ? 0 (?)
¢
(1? ?)? 1
2
¡
??1 (?) + ? 0 (?)
¢
? ? 0 (20)
The ?rst term corresponds to the chance that the state is ? and the voter (rightly) casts the decisive
vote in favor of D , while the second term corresponds to the chance that the state is ? and the voter
(wrongly) casts the decisive vote in favor of D . The inequality in (20) is equivalent to 1??? ?
???1(?)
???1(?) .
Along the same lines, we ?nd that the voter’s payo? from abstaining is strictly greater than from
voting for R if and only if 1??? ?
?˜ 1(?)
?˜ 1(?) . Combining these inequalities yields the result.
With the help of Lemma 7, we can now prove Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 1:
We prove the Lemma by showing that, for ? su?ciently large, ??
1(?)
?? 1(?) ?
???1(?)
???1(?) . The fact that
?? 1(?)
?? 1(?) ?
?˜1(?)+?˜?1(?)
?˜1(?)+?˜?1(?) ?
???1(?)
???1(?) then follows as an arithmetic necessity.
Recall that
??1 (?) = ???(?R(?)+?D (?))
?X
?=0
(??D (?))?
?!
(??R (?))?+1
(?+ 1)!
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Following Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1999), we use the modi?ed Bessel function
?? (?) =
μ
1
2
?
¶? ?X
?=0
¡
1
4?2
¢?
?! (?+ ?)!
to get that
??1 (?) = ???(?R(?)+?D (?))
s
?R (?)
?D (?)
?1
³
2?
p
?D (?) ?R (?)
´
For ? ? {0? 1}, lim
???
???
2??
??(?) = 1. Hence, for large ?,
??1 (?) ?
s
?R (?)
?D (?)
???
??
?D (?)?
?
?R(?)
?2q
4?
p
??D (?)
p
??R (?)
(21)
Analogous calculations for ? 0 (?) and ? 1 (?) yield
? 0 (?) ? ?
??
??
?D (?)?
?
?R(?)
?2q
4?
p
??D (?)
p
??R (?)
(22)
? 1 (?) ?
s
?D (?)
?R (?)
???
??
?D (?)?
?
?R(?)
?2q
4?
p
??D (?)
p
??R (?)
(23)
Now suppose that, contrary to the claim in the lemma,
?? 1(?)
?? 1(?) ?
???1(?)
???1(?) . Then, for su?ciently
large ?, it must be that
1 +
q
?D (?)
?R(?)
1 +
q
?R(?)
?D (?)
?
1 +
q
?D (?)
?R(?)
1 +
q
?R(?)
?D (?)
Because the function 1+?
1+ 1?
is strictly increasing in ?, the last inequality is equivalent to
?D (?)
?R (?)
? ?D (?)?R (?)
(24)
Denote by ?DR the set of voters who, in equilibrium, strictly prefer
¡
?DR? (?) , DR
¢
over DD
and RR. Denote by ?RR the set of voters who weakly prefer RR over
¡
?DR? (?) , DR
¢
and DD .
Finally, denote by ?DD the set of voters who weakly prefer DD over
¡
?DR? (?) , DR
¢
and RR.
Because DD?DR ? DR?RR by Lemma 6, we have ?DD = [0?DD ?DR], ?DR = (DD?DR?DR ?RR),
and ?DD = [DR?RR? 1]. Moreover, from Lemma 7 we know that when
??1(?)
?? 1(?) ?
???1(?)
???1(?) , nobody
38
abstains. Hence, in state ?, the probability that a randomly drawn voter votes for R is
?R (?) = ?? + (1? ?)
?
?
Z
?DR
?DR? (?) ? (?) ?? +
Z
?RR
? (?) ??
?
?
Similarly, in state ?, the probability that a randomly drawn voter votes for R is
?R (?) = ?? + (1? ?)
?
?
Z
?DR
¡
1??
¡
?DR? (?)
¢¢
? (?) ?? +
Z
?RR
? (?) ??
?
?
Notice that for all ? ? ?DR, 0 ? ?DR? (?) ? 1. The ?rst part Lemma 4 then implies that
?DR? (?) ? 1 ? ?
¡
?DR? (?)
¢
. Hence, ?R (?) ? ?R (?) and ?D (?) ? ?D (?), which contradicts the
inequality in (24). This completes the proof.
B.3 Proof of Proposition 1
This section contains a proof of Proposition 1; i.e., the claim that equilibrium exists, and that
equilibrium voting strategies are of the form DD ;D?;DR;?R;RR or DD ;D?;?R;RR.
First we show that, for any ? ? (0? 1)6, the payo?s of the various unresponsive voting strategies
satisfy single-crossing. We also calculate closed-form solutions for these crossing points. With slight
abuse of notation, we use the same notational convention for crossing points as for transition types
between responsive and unresponsive voting strategies, i.e., ?? ??? .
Lemma 8 Fix some ?? (0? 1)6. The payo?s of unresponsive voting strategies DD, ??, and RR
satisfy single-crossing in ?.
Speci?cally,
1. ?? (DD) ? ?? (??) i? ? ? DD??? ? 1?˜?1(?)
?˜?1(?)+1
2. ?? (??) ? ?? (RR) i? ? ? ???RR ? 1?˜1(?)
?˜1(?)+1
3. ?? (DD) ? ?? (RR) i? ? ? DD?RR ? 1?˜1(?)+?˜?1(?)
?˜1(?)+?˜?1(?)+1
Proof. The result trivially follows from the expressions for expected payo?s given in Remark 1.
Together, Lemmas 6 and 8 allow us to derive the following partial ordering of transition types
and crossing points.
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Lemma 9 Fix some ?? (0? 1)6. Transition types and crossing points ?? ??? satisfy the following
partial order:
0 ? D????
?
? DR?RR
?
? ?R?RR
?
? 1
0 ? DD???
?
? DD?RR
?
? ???RR
?
? 1
0 ? DD?D? ? DD?DR ? ????R ? 1
Proof. From Lemma 1, we know that ?˜
1(?)
?˜ 1(?) ?
?˜ 1(?)+?˜?1(?)
?˜ 1(?)+?˜?1(?) ?
?˜?1(?)
?˜?1(?) . From the second part of
Lemma 4, we know that 0 ? ??0 (0) ? 1 ? ??0 (1) ??. The ranking then follows from applying
these inequalities to the closed-form solutions for the various ?? ??? derived in Lemmas 6 and 8,
and the fact that ?? (0? 1)6.
We now show that, for any ? ? (0? 1)6, the payo?s of responsive voting strategies also satisfy
single-crossing, provided that ????1??? and ????1??? are strictly increasing.
Lemma 10 Fix some ?? (0? 1)6. If ????1??? and ????1??? are strictly increasing in ?? and ??,
respectively, then the indirect utilities of the responsive voting strategies DR, D?, and ?R satisfy
single-crossing.
Speci?cally,
1. On ? ? [DD?DR? D????], ?? (DR)? ?? (D?) crosses zero at most once, and from below.
2. On ? ? [????R? DR?RR], ?? (DR)? ?? (?R) crosses zero at most once, and from above.
3. On ? ? [????R? D????], ?? (D?)? ?? (?R) crosses zero exactly once, and from above.
Proof. Part 1: From the expressions for ??
DR
?
? (DR) and ?
?D??
? (D?) given in Remark 1, we ?nd
??
DR
?
? (DR)? ?
?D??
? (D?)
1? ? =
(
?˜?1 (?) + ?˜ 1 (?)
2
?DR? (?)?
?˜?1 (?)
2
?D?? (?)
)
?
1? ?
+
(
?˜?1 (?)
2
¡
1??
¡
?D?? (?)
¢¢
? ?˜
?1 (?) + ?˜ 1 (?)
2
¡
1??
¡
?DR? (?)
¢¢)
Using the ?rst-order conditions for ?DR? (?) and ?D?? (?) given in Lemma 5 and simplifying yields
?? (DR)? ?? (D?)
1? ? (25)
=
?˜?1 (?)
2
¡
?D?? ?0
¡
?D??
¢
+
¡
1??
¡
?D??
¢¢¢
? ?˜
?1 (?) + ?˜ 1 (?)
2
¡
?DR? ?0
¡
?DR?
¢
+
¡
1??
¡
?DR?
¢¢¢
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Hence, ??(DR)???(D?)1?? ? 0 i?
?˜?1 (?)
?˜?1 (?) + ?˜ 1 (?)
?
?DR? ?0
¡
?DR?
¢
+ 1??
¡
?DR?
¢
?D?? ?0 (?D?? ) + 1?? (?D?? )
(26)
To prove the claim, we will show that the RHS of (26) is strictly increasing in ?. Di?erentiating
with respect to ? and simplifying yields that the RHS of (26) is strictly increasing if
?00
¡
?DR? (?)
¢ ??DR? (?)
?? ?
DR
? (?)
¡
1??
¡
?D?? (?)
¢
+?0
¡
?D?? (?)
¢
?D?? (?)
¢
(27)
? ?00
¡
?D?? (?)
¢ ??D?? (?)
?? ?
D?
? (?)
¡
1??
¡
?DR? (?)
¢
+?0
¡
?DR? (?)
¢
?DR? (?)
¢
From the ?rst-order conditions for ?DR? (?) and ?D?? (?) it follows that
?00
¡
?DR?
¢ ??DR? (?)
?? = ?
0 ¡?DR? ¢ 1? (1? ?)
?00
¡
?D??
¢ ??D?? (?)
?? = ?
0 ¡?D?? ¢ 1? (1? ?)
Substituting these expressions for ?00 back into (27) and rearranging, we ?nd that the RHS of (26)
is strictly increasing in ? if
??0
¡
?DR?
¢
?DR?
1?? (?DR? )
?
??0
¡
?D??
¢
?D??
1?? (?D?? )
(28)
Notice that ??
0(??)??
1??(??) = ??? ?1??? , which is strictly increasing by assumption. Moreover, from Lemma
2, we know that ?DR? (?) ? ?D?? (?). Hence, the inequality in (28) indeed holds.
We may conclude that ??(DR)???(D?)1?? –and, therefore, ?? (DR)??? (D?)–crosses zero at most
once, and from below.
Part 2: The proof is analogous to Part 1.
Part 3: The expression for ??(DR)???(D?)1?? in (25) and its analogue for
??(DR)???(?R)
1?? yield
?? (D?)? ?? (?R)
1? ?
=
?? (DR)? ?? (?R)
1? ? ?
?? (DR)? ?? (D?)
1? ?
=
?˜ 1 (?) + ?˜?1 (?)
2
¡
?0
¡
?DR?
¢
+ 1
¢
? ?˜
?1 (?)
2
¡
?D?? ?0
¡
?D??
¢
+
¡
1??
¡
?D??
¢¢¢
? ?˜
1 (?)
2
¡
?
¡
??R?
¢
+?0
¡
??R?
¢ ¡
1? ??R?
¢¢
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The ?rst-order conditions (17), (18), and (19) imply that
??0
¡
?DR?
¢
=
?˜?1 (?)
?˜?1 (?) + ?˜ 1 (?)
¡
??0
¡
?D??
¢¢
+
?˜ 1 (?)
?˜?1 (?) + ?˜ 1 (?)
¡
??0
¡
??R?
¢¢
Hence,
?? (D?)? ?? (?R)
1? ? (29)
=
?˜?1 (?)
2
¡
?
¡
?D??
¢
+?0
¡
?D??
¢ ¡
1? ?D??
¢¢
+
?˜ 1 (?)
2
¡
1??
¡
??R?
¢
+?0
¡
??R?
¢
??R?
¢
To prove the claim, we will show that the RHS of (29) is strictly increasing in ?. Di?erentiating
the RHS with respect to ? gives
?˜?1 (?)
2
¡
1? ?D??
¢
?00
¡
?D??
¢ ??D??
?? +
?˜ 1 (?)
2
??R? ?00
¡
??R?
¢ ???R?
?? (30)
From the ?rst-order conditions (18) and (19), it follows that
?00
¡
?D??
¢ ??D??
?? = ?
?˜?1 (?)
?˜?1 (?)
1
(1? ?)2
?00
¡
??R?
¢ ???R?
?? = ?
?˜ 1 (?)
?˜ 1 (?)
1
(1? ?)2
Substituting these expressions back into (30), we ?nd that the derivative of the RHS of (29) is
?1
2
³¡
1? ?D??
¢
?˜?1 (?) + ??R? ?˜ 1 (?)
´ 1
(1? ?)2
? 0
We may conclude that ??(D?)???(?R)1?? is strictly decreasing in ? on [????R? D????]. Hence,
?? (D?)? ?? (?R) crosses zero at most once, and from above.
To see that a crossing indeed takes place, notice that at ? = ????R, ??R? = 0 ? ?D?? , where the
inequality follows from Lemma 2. Hence, at ????R, ?? (D?) ? ?? (?R) = ?? (??). Similarly, at
? = D????, ?D?? = 1 ? ??R? , which implies that ?? (D?) = ?? (??) ? ?? (?R). The intermediate
value theorem then proves the result.
Next, we prove that, for any ? ? (0? 1)6, DR and ?? never coexist.
Lemma 11 Fix some ?? (0? 1)6. If, for this ? , ?? is played by a positive measure of voters
? ? [0? 1], then the measure of voters playing DR is zero.
Proof. We prove the lemma by showing that when DR is played for a particular ? ? (0? 1)6, then
?? is not played.
A necessary condition for DR to be played is that, conditional on ??, D is weakly better than
?. Similarly, conditional on ??, R must be weakly better than ?.
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The expected payo? of voting for D–respectively, R–conditional on ? is
???? (D | ?) = ? (?)?
½μ
? 1 (?) + ? 0 (?) + 1
2
??1 (?)
¶
???? (?) +
1
2
??1 (?)
¡
1? ???? (?)
¢¾
???? (R | ?) = ? (?)?
½
1
2
? 1 (?) ???? (?) +
μ
1
2
? 1 (?) + ? 0 (?) + ??1 (?)
¶¡
1? ???? (?)
¢¾
while the expected payo? of abstaining is
???? (? | ??) = ? (?)?
½μ
? 1 (?) + 1
2
? 0 (?)
¶
???? (?) +
μ
1
2
? 0 (?) + ??1 (?)
¶¡
1? ???? (?)
¢¾
Hence, ???? (D | ??) ? ???? (? | ??) if and only if
???? (??)
1? ???? (??)
? ?˜
?1 (?)
?˜?1 (?)
Using (5), we can rewrite this as
?
1? ? ?
? (??)
1? ??
?˜?1 (?)
?˜?1 (?)
By Lemma 4, ?(??)1??? is strictly increasing in ??. Hence,
?
1? ? ? lim???1
? (??)
1? ??
?˜?1 (?)
?˜?1 (?)
= ??0 (1) ?˜
?1 (?)
?˜?1 (?)
(31)
Analogous calculations show that if ???? (R | ??) ? ???? (? | ??), then
?
1? ? ? lim???0
1?? (??)
??
?˜ 1 (?)
?˜ 1 (?)
= ??0 (0) ?˜
1 (?)
?˜ 1 (?)
(32)
Together, (31) and (32) imply that
??0 (0) ?˜
1 (?)
?˜ 1 (?)
? ??0 (1) ?˜
?1 (?)
?˜?1 (?)
(33)
Next, notice that a necessary condition for ?? to be played is that
D???? ? ????R
or, equivalently,
D????
1 ? D????
= ??0 (1) ?˜
?1 (?)
?˜?1 (?)
? ??0 (0) ?˜
1 (?)
?˜ 1 (?)
=
????R
1 ? ????R
(34)
Finally, observe that (34) contradicts (33). This proves the lemma.
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The following lemma establishes that the voting strategy ?? is never played in equilibrium.
(Notice that, in contrast to the previous lemmas, Lemma 12 below is only true in equilibrium, and
not for arbitrary ? ? (0? 1)6.)
Lemma 12 ?? is not played in equilibrium.
Proof. We prove the lemma by showing that, in equilibrium, ????R ? D????. This is equivalent
to showing that
?˜ 1 (?)
?˜ 1 (?)
?˜?1 (?)
?˜?1 (?)
? ??
0 (1)
??0 (0) (35)
The expressions for ? ? (?), ? ? {?1? 0? 1}, in (21), (22), and (23) imply
?˜ 1 (?)
?˜ 1 (?)
?˜?1 (?)
?˜?1 (?)
=
?R (?)
?R (?)
?D (?)
?D (?)
(36)
Substituting (36) into (35) gives that ????R ? D???? if and only if
?R (?)
?R (?)
?D (?)
?D (?)
? ??
0 (1)
??0 (0) (37)
Next, notice that
?R (?)
?R (?)
=
?? + (1? ?)
³R
??DR
?DR (?) ?? (?) +
R
???R
??R (?) ?? (?) +
R
??RR
?? (?)
´
?? + (1? ?)
³R
??DR
(1?? (?DR (?))) ?? (?) +
R
???R
(1?? (??R (?))) ?? (?) +
R
??RR
?? (?)
´
By strict concavity of ?, we have
? (?) ? ? (0) +?0 (0) ?
which yields
1?? (?) ? ??0 (0) ?
Therefore,
?R (?)
?R (?)
?
?? + (1? ?)
³R
??DR
?DR (?) ?? (?) +
R
???R
??R (?) ?? (?) +
R
??RR
?? (?)
´
?? + (1? ?)
³
??0 (0)
³R
??DR
?DR (?) ?? (?) +
R
???R
(??R (?)) ?? (?)
´
+
R
??RR
?? (?)
´
? 1??0 (0) (38)
where the last inequality follows from the fact ??0 (0) ? 1.
An analogous argument reveals that
?D (?)
?D (?)
? ??0 (1) (39)
Combining (38) and (39) implies (37).
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This completes the proof.
Before proceeding with the actual proof of Proposition 1, we introduce some more notation.
Fix some ?? (0? 1)6 and let ?DD be the set of voters ? ? [0? 1] for whom the strategy DD is a best
response conditional on ? . That is, for given pivotal probabilities, the indirect utility from DD is
(weakly) greater than the indirect utility from any other strategy. Let ?RR and ??? be analogously
de?ned. De?ne ?DR, to be the set of voters ? ? [0? 1] for whom the strategy
¡
?DR? (?) ?DR
¢
is a
best response and 0 ? ?DR? (?) ? 1. Let ?D? and ??R be analogously de?ned to ?DR.
Proof of Proposition 1:
We prove the proposition in three steps. In Step 1 we show that, for ?xed ?? (0? 1)6, voting
strategies take on one of three forms, namely, 1) DD ;D?;DR;?R;RR, 2) DD ;D?;?R;RR, or 3)
DD ;D?;??;?R;RR. Using the structure this imposes, in Step 2, we prove that an equilibrium
always exists. Finally, in Step 3, we invoke Lemma 12 to conclude that, in equilibrium, only voting
strategies of forms 1) and 2) can occur.
Step 1: Fix some ?? (0? 1)6. Lemma 11 establishes that when ?? is played, then DR is not
played. This implies that we may restrict attention to three possible cases, namely: 1) ?? is played
and DR is not played; 2) DR is played and ?? is not played; 3) Neither ?? nor DR are played.
Case 1: Suppose that ?? is played and DR is not played. In that case, we have to consider
the voting strategies DD , D?, ??, ?R, and RR.
From Lemma 8, we know that the payo?s of the unresponsive voting strategies DD , ??, and
RR satisfy single-crossing in ?. Speci?cally, voter ? prefers DD over ?? i? ? ? DD??? ? 1?˜?1(?)
?˜?1(?)+1
;
he prefers RR over ?? i? ? ? ???RR ? 1?˜?1(?)
?˜?1(?)+1
; and he prefers DD over RR i? ? ? DD?RR ?
1
?˜1(?)+?˜?1(?)
?˜1(?)+?˜?1(?)+1
. As to the crossing point between the responsive strategies D? and ?R, notice the
following. Because ?? is played, it must be that D???? ? ????R. Hence, at the point where D?
and ?R generate equal payo?s, both voting strategies have already degenerated into ??. Therefore,
D? and ?R do not cross.
From Lemma 9 and the fact that D???? ? ????R, we know that transition types and crossing
points can be ranked as follows:
0 ? DD?D? ? DD??? ? D???? ? ????R ? ???RR ? ?R?RR
and DD??? ? DD?RR ? ???RR
This implies that ?DD (? ) = [0?DD ?D?], ?D? (? ) = (DD?D??D? ???), ??? (? ) = [D??????? ??R],
??R (? ) = (????R??R ?RR), and ?RR (? ) = [?R?RR? 1]. Hence, if ?? is played and DR is not
played, ? (? ) takes on the form DD ;D?;??;?R;RR.
Case 2: Suppose that DR is played and ?? is not played. In that case, we have to consider
the voting strategies DD , D?, DR, ?R, and RR.
From Lemma 9, we know that
0 ? DD?D? ? DD?DR ? DD?RR ? DR?RR ? ?R?RR ? 1
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This implies that inf ?DR ? DD?D? and sup?DR ? ?R?RR. In words: ?DR begins strictly to
the right of where ?D? begins, and ends strictly to the left of where ??R ends. By Lemma 10,
?? (DR) ? ?? (D?) crosses zero at most once and from above, while ?? (DR) ? ?? (?R) crosses
zero at most once, and from below. Because, by assumption, the interior of ?DR is not empty, the
crossing points D??DR and DR??R must indeed exist and D??DR ? DR??R.
This implies that?DD (? ) = [0?DD ?D?], ?D? (? ) = (DD?D??D? ?DR], ?DR (? ) = [D??DR?DR ??R],
??R (? ) = [DR??R??R ?RR), and ?RR (? ) = [?R?RR? 1]. Hence, if DR is played and ?? is not
played, then ? (? ) takes on the form DD ;D?;DR;?R;RR.
Case 3: Suppose that neither DR nor ?? are played. In that case, we have to consider the
voting strategies DD , D?, ?R, and RR.
Because neither ?? nor DR are played, it must be that ????R ? D????. (Else, ?? would
be played by all ? ? [D????? ????R].) The third part of Lemma 10 then implies that the cross-
ing point, D???R, between D? and ?R exists, is unique, and lies between ????R and D???? .
Combining this with the ranking in Lemma 9, we may conclude that
0 ? DD?D? ? D???R ? ?R?RR ? 1
This implies that ?DD (? ) = [0?DD ?D?], ?D? (? ) = (DD?D??D? ??R), ??R (? ) = (D???R??R ?RR),
and ?RR (? ) = [?R?RR? 1]. Hence, if neither DR nor ?? are played, then ? (? ) takes on the form
DD ;D?;?R;RR.
Step 2: We prove existence of equilibrium by showing that there exists a ?xed point in piv-
otal probabilities, ? ? ? (0? 1)6, and that it gives rise to a ?xed point in best-responses, i.e., an
equilibrium.
From (9), (10), and (11) we know that ?DR? (?;? ), ?D?? (?;? ), and ??R? (?;? ) are continuous
functions of ? . As a result, the indirect utility functions, ?? (DR;? ), ?? (D?;? ), ?? (?R;? ),
?? (DD ;? ), ?? (RR;? ), and ?? (??;? ) are also continuous in ? .
The probability that a random voter casts a vote for R in state ? is
?R (?;? ) = ? (1? ?) + ?
?
??
Z
?DR(? )
?DR? (?) ? (?) ?? +
Z
??R(? )
??R? (?) ? (?) ?? +
Z
?RR(? )
? (?) ??
?
??
The expressions for ?D (?;? ), ?D (?;? ), and ?R (?;? ) are analogous. Recall from Step 1 that, for
all ?? (0? 1)6, the sets ??? (? ) ? {??? } ? {D ???R}2, partition the interval [0? 1]. Moreover,
the boundaries between them, which consist of transition types and crossing points ?? ??? , are
continuous in ? . This implies that all ?? (?;? ), where ? ? {D ?R} and ? ? {?? ?}, are also
continuous in ? . Finally, notice that the probability of each vote count is a continuous function of
?? (?;? ). This makes ? a continuous function of itself. Denote the implied mapping by ?.
Since {?? ?} ? (0? 1)2, ?? (?;? ) ? 0. Hence, there exists a 0 ? ? ? 12 such that, for all ?? (0? 1)6,
? (? ) ? [?? 1? ?]6. Applying Brouwer’s ?xed-point theorem to the mapping ? : [?? 1? ?]6 ?
[?? 1? ?]6 implies that ? admits a ?xed point ? ? = ? (? ?)? [?? 1? ?]6.
Since voters’ best responses are pinned down by ?DR? (?;? ), ?D?? (?;? ), ??R? (?;? ) and ??? (? ),
{??? } ? {D ???R}2, a ?xed point ? ? gives rise to a ?xed point in best responses and, hence, an
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equilibrium of the voting game.
Step 3: Finally, from Lemma 12 we know that, in equilibrium, ?? is not played. Hence, at ? ?,
? ? can only be of the form DD ;D?;DR;?R;RR or DD ;D?;?R;RR.
This completes the proof of Proposition 1.
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